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I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (Scalia, J., majority
opinion; 7-2)

Summary: The National Voting Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) authorizes the federal
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to design a form that the states must use to register
persons to vote in federal elections. At present, that form simply requires that a person
aver, under penalty of perjury, that the person is an American citizen. In 2004, the people
of Arizona adopted Proposition 200, which requires county recorders to reject any
application for voter registration that is not accompanied by documentary evidence of
American citizenship. The issue before the Court was whether the NVRA pre-empts
Proposition 200. The Elections Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
regulate how federal elections are held and grants the states the power to determine who
votes in those elections. The EAC properly acted pursuant to the power granted by the
NVRA. However, the states are free to request the federal government to amend the federal
registration form to include any information necessary to enable state election officials to
assess the eligibility of the applicant.
Holding: Yes, the NVRA pre-empts Proposition 200.

Significance: From a constitutional standpoint, the decision is not surprising. The Arizona
statute was in direct conflict with the federal regulation, and under standard preemption
doctrine the state law must yield. From the perspective of voting rights, the Court’s dicta
regarding the right of the state to request changes to the federal form may make it possible
for the states to place yet another procedural roadblock in the path of eligible voters.
Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion; 7-1)

Summary: Abigail Fisher applied for admission to the University of Texas at Austin and
was rejected. She challenged the constitutionality of the admissions system used by the
University. Specifically, she contended that the affirmative action program used by the
University violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution because it favored
African-Americans over White applicants. The Court of Appeals upheld the affirmative
action program. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that “strict scrutiny” applies because
the government was taking the race of student applicants into account. However, the Court
of Appeals deferred to the judgment of the University as to the extent of diversity necessary
to enhance the educational experience of the student body. The Court ruled that, while it
was appropriate to defer to the judgment of the University as to the value and necessity for
diversity, it was not appropriate to defer to the judgment of the University as to the extent
of affirmative action necessary to achieve that goal. How far affirmative action may go – the
“critical mass” of minority students necessary to create a vibrant and diverse experience
for everybody – is to be determined by the courts as a matter of law under the Constitution,
not by educational officials.
1

Holding: The lower court failed to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating whether the
University of Texas at Austin’s admissions procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 7-1 decision, the Court vacated and remanded the case
to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether the race-conscious element of the University’s
admissions program satisfies strict scrutiny.

Significance: For higher education, this holding impacts the extent to which schools will be
able to rely upon affirmative action policies as part of their admissions procedures. Four
justices on the Court believe that affirmative action admissions programs are
unconstitutional; four justices believe that they are constitutional; and Justice Kennedy is
conflicted.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: Although this case presented the question whether California’s Proposition 8
(denying same-sex couples the right to marry) was constitutional, the Supreme Court did
not reach that issue on the merits. Instead, the Court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Public officials of the State of California were parties to the action in the
trial court and defended the constitutionality of Proposition 8 at the trial level. They
declined to appeal the trial court’s decision striking down Proposition 8, so supporters of
Proposition 8 filed an appeal. Unlike the public officials, the supporters of Proposition 8
sustained no injury to their legal rights when the law was struck down: the trial court
neither ordered them to do anything nor enjoined them from doing anything. Accordingly
they had no standing to appeal from the decision of the trial court.
Holding: The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the supporters of Proposition 8
lacked standing to appeal the District Court’s decision.

Significance: In Windsor the United States remained as a party to the action and filed
appeals at every step of the litigation process. In Hollingsworth the State of California
decided not to appeal the decision of the trial court. In both cases there were competent
attorneys who were well-prepared to defend the law in question – the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group attorneys for the House of Representatives in Windsor and the attorneys
for the Proposition 8 supporters in Hollingsworth – but the difference between the cases
was that the government was a party to the appeal in Windsor and was not a party to the
appeal in Hollingsworth. Another significant aspect of the decision, though unmentioned in
the opinion, is that this ruling implicitly confirms the crucial fact that the opponents of
same-sex marriage are not harmed by the marriages of gay and lesbian couples. They do
not suffer even the threshold legal injury needed to create a “case or controversy” that will
confer jurisdiction. This makes it more difficult to argue that the government has a
legitimate interest in prohibiting same-sex marriage.
McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013) (Alito, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Mark McBurney, a resident of Rhode Island, and Roger Hurlbut, a resident of
California, requested records from state agencies in the State of Virginia under Virginia’s
2

Freedom of Information Act. However, that law only applies to citizens of the State of
Virginia and does not offer relief to citizens of other states. The plaintiffs challenged this
law as violating both the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the dormant
Commerce Clause. The Court ruled that Virginia’s FOIA was not adopted for a
“protectionist” purpose; that is, that it was not adopted to give Virginia citizens a
competitive advantage in the economic marketplace dealing with public records. Instead,
the law was adopted to ensure that Virginia’s citizens had ready access to public records so
that they could hold their own public officials accountable for public conduct. Accordingly,
the law did not infringe upon any “privileges” or “immunities” of American citizens of other
states. Furthermore, the Court ruled that even if it were found that the dissemination of
public records constituted an economic market and the dormant Commerce Clause applied
to this type of law, under the Market Participant Doctrine, the states have the power to
treat their own citizens more favorably than out-of-state citizens.
Holding: The Virginia statute granting ready access to public records only to citizens of the
state did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the dormant Commerce
Clause.
Significance: There was no denial of due process in either of these cases; there were other
procedures (albeit more expensive, more cumbersome, and more time-consuming) by
which the Plaintiffs could have obtained the records in question. Despite the Equal
Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrines, there are a number of ways in which the States are
permitted to discriminate against citizens of other states, including a longer waiting period
to obtain a divorce, higher fees for hunting licenses, and higher tuition at state schools.
Ready access to public records under state FOIAs may now be added to that list.
Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) (Thomas, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: A federal prisoner alleged that correctional officers sexually assaulted and
threatened him. He sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The
Court of Appeals dismissed the suit on the ground that, while the federal government has
waived sovereign immunity for intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers,
the waiver applied only to tortious conduct that occurs in the course of executing a search,
seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The Court disagreed, utilizing a strictly literal
reading of the FTCA to find that the government had waived sovereign immunity for
intentional torts by correctional officers.
Holding: The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals and reinstated
the prisoner’s suit.
Significance: The ruling significantly broadens the rights of prisoners and the liability of
the government towards prisoners.

3

Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) is one of the most important pieces of civil
rights legislation ever adopted by Congress. It was intended to undo a century of state law
attacks on the right of African-Americans to vote. The core provision of the Act was
contained in Sections 4 and 5, which required certain states and portions of states to obtain
the permission of the Department of Justice before adopting changes to their election laws:
the “preclearance” provisions. In 2006 Congress overwhelmingly re-enacted the Voting
Rights Act; however, it did not adjust the boundaries of the jurisdictions subject to the
preclearance provisions. Instead jurisdictions subject to the preclearance provisions were
left subject to existing requirements based upon 1970 data. The Court ruled that in failing
to adjust the preclearance boundaries to current conditions, Congress exceeded its power
under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court found that the
preclearance provisions were irrational because they violate the implicit rights of the
states to “equal sovereignty.”
Holding: The Court struck down the preclearance requirements of the VRA.

Significance: The VRA has been one of the most successful pieces of civil rights legislation,
and this decision erodes the most important protections in the VRA. The decision may
open the door for states to begin enacting voting laws and procedures that create obstacles
for minority voters who wish to participate in the political process.
United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12 (2012) (Scalia, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: James Bormes paid a filing fee to a federal district court. The receipt that was
returned to him contained the last four digits of his credit card and its expiration date, in
violation of the privacy provisions of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, which provides
for a remedy against “any person” who violates the Act, and which defines a person as
including “a government.” Accordingly, Bormes sued the United States for violation of the
FCRA. The United States defended on the ground that Bormes’ FCRA claim was barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The usual test for determining whether sovereign
immunity has been waived is whether the law “unambigiously” waives that immunity.
Bormes responded by asserting that since the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2),
confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear damages actions against the United States,
sovereign immunity had been waived. The Court of Appeals agreed with Bormes and ruled
that in light of the Little Tucker Act, sovereign immunity would be waived if a federal
statute “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation.” The Supreme Court ruled
that the Little Tucker Act is jurisdictional only and does not affect the standard for
determining waiver of sovereign immunity. The “fair interpretation” test does not apply in
this situation.
Holding: The Supreme Court remanded because the Court of Appeals used the wrong
standard in determining whether the FCRA waives sovereign immunity. It should have
determined whether the FCRA “unambiguously” waives the sovereign immunity of the
federal government.
4

Significance: The Court made it a little harder to sue the federal government for damages.
United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013) (Breyer, J., majority opinion; 7-2)

Summary: In 1999 when the defendant was a 20-year-old member of the Air Force, he had
sex with a 15-year-old girl. He was convicted of statutory rape, received a dishonorable
discharge, and served three months in prison. Upon release he was required to comply
with state-law sex offender registration requirements. In 2006 Congress enacted the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), a federal law that requires persons
convicted of federal sex offenses to register in the United States where they live, study, and
work. The law was applied retroactively to persons who had already been convicted and
released from prison. Kebodeaux violated SORNA when he moved within the State of Texas
and failed to re-register with the United States. Kebodeaux challenged the constitutionality
of SORNA on the ground that Congress lacked the power to adopt SORNA. The Court ruled
that Congress had the power to enact SORNA, at least as applied to this case, under its
enumerated power to “make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces.” Furthermore, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress “large discretion” to
“adopt any means, appearing to it most eligible and appropriate” to carry out its
enumerated power to regulate the military.
Holding: SORNA was upheld, at least as applied to Kebodeaux.

Significance: This case was decided on narrow grounds because the offender was a
member of the military when he committed the act in question.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: The State of New York recognized the marriage of Edith Schlain Windsor to
Thea Spyer. However, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act prohibits the federal
government from recognizing same-sex marriages as valid. The principal issue on the
merits in this case was whether the Defense of Marriage Act is constitutional. As a
threshold issue, the Court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction to decide this case
despite the fact that the United States took the same position as Edie Windsor, arguing that
the law was unconstitutional. The United States government, having declined to defend
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act while continuing to enforce it, had standing to
appeal a U. S. District Court’s invalidation of that provision. The District Court’s order
directing the Treasury to pay money to the Pntiff, even if welcomed by the government,
constituted injury to it. The intervention of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S.
House of Representatives satisfied the prudential rule against adjudicating the
constitutionality of statutes in friendly, non-adversarial proceedings.
On the merits, the Court considered whether the federal government was infringing on the
power of the States by defining who was married and who was not, but found it
“unnecessary” to decide the case on the grounds of Federalism. Instead, the Court found
that Section 3 of DOMA violates the individual rights of gay and lesbian couples.
Specifically, the Court ruled that Section 3 of DOMA violates the Equal Protection
5

component of, as well as the liberty interests protected by, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The Court found that the law was adopted for the sole purpose of
injuring the rights of gay and lesbian couples – that the law was intended to denigrate them
and their relationships. Accordingly, the law was not justified by any legitimate
governmental interest
Holding: The United States has standing to appeal and Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Significance: This is the most significant gay rights case to date. The reasoning of the Court
was quite sweeping. The Court did not principally base its decision on federalism grounds,
as many had predicted, but instead found that DOMA violates the constitutional rights of
gay and lesbian couples. The Court found that Congress did not have even a legitimate
reason to deny recognition to the lawful unions of same-sex couples. In future cases
defending their own “defense of marriage” acts, the states will have to assert rationales
different from or in addition to those asserted in support of the federal act – and that might
be difficult. On the jurisdictional issue of standing to litigate, this decision makes it clear
that the federal government may appeal a decision invalidating a federal law despite the
fact that it agrees with the decision as long as (1) the government is prepared to enforce
the law unless it is invalidated by the courts, and (2) a party intervenes to defend the law,
thereby maintaining an adversarial proceeding.
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (Alito, J., majority opinion; 54)

Summary: Respondent Amnesty International USA, a group of activists, lawyers, and
journalists, sought prospective relief from the federal government’s exercise of its foreign
wiretapping authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1881(a), which allows the surveillance of individuals who are not “United States Persons”
and who are reasonably believed to be outside the United States. Petitioners argued that
Respondent proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire its
international communications using § 1881(a)-authorized surveillance and did not show
that an injunction prohibiting § 1881(a)-authorized surveillance would likely redress its
purported injuries. The Court concluded that Respondent failed to demonstrate that the
future injury was certain and that the future injury was fairly traceable to the FISA
provision at issue. Further, its costs incurred to avoid surveillance were not fairly
traceable to the FISA provision at issue.
Holding: Respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief from the federal
government’s exercise of its foreign wiretapping authority under FISA because the
threatened injury is not certainly impending.

Significance: This decision makes it more difficult to challenge the federal government’s
exercise of its foreign wiretapping authority under FISA, and somewhat more difficult in
general to challenge governmental acts that threaten future harm.
6

Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2321 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion; 6-2)

Summary: The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS Act (Leadership Act) requires
that organizations receiving federal funds to combat HIV/AIDS abroad have a policy
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. The Respondents, recipients of funds under the
Leadership Act, wish to remain neutral on prostitution and sought a declaratory judgment
that the requirement violates their First Amendment rights.
Holding: The requirement in the Leadership Act is an unconstitutional condition that
compels speech in violation of the First Amendment.

Significance: This decision reinforces and arguably strengthens the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. It may offer additional protection to organizations such as
Planned Parenthood that legislatures try to deny public funding to because of
disagreements with their ideological positions.

II.

CRIMINAL LAW
A.

Fourth Amendment

Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion; 6-3)

Summary: The Court interpreted the Michigan v. Summers rule, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), which
allowed police to detain an individual pursuant to the execution of a search warrant. The
Court stated that the rule of Summers is spatially constrained because detention was
designed to be a means of ensuring officer safety, preventing flight, and promoting an
orderly search. The rule does not apply when the individual who was detained elsewhere
had left the immediate vicinity of the premises before the warrant was executed.
Holding: The detention of persons not in the immediate vicinity of the search warrant
location violates the Fourth Amendment.
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: Missouri argued for a rule that would allow officers to obtain a blood test
whenever an allegedly drunk driver was seized, claiming that the natural dissipation of
alcohol in the bloodstream creates an exigent circumstance. Exigencies must be viewed on
case-by-case basis under the totality of the circumstances. The Court stated that
technological advances that allow search warrants to be obtained more quickly are
relevant in assessing whether exigencies are present to justify warrantless search. If
officers can reasonably obtain a search warrant without significantly undermining the
efficacy of the search, they need to do so.

7

Holding: Though exigent circumstances may give police authority to take a blood sample
from a driver without a search warrant, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
bloodstream does not in every case constitute an exigency justifying a non-consensual
blood test without a search warrant.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (Scalia, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: Police had a trained narcotics detection dog sniff at the front door of a house
following an unverified tip that marijuana was growing inside. The Court stated that this
was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage of the home and intruded on reasonable
expectations of privacy. Having a door knocker on the house did not constitute an implied
license to enter the curtilage to conduct a search. Officers can approach a house and knock
on the door as other members of the public can do – this would be permissible pursuant to
the implied license; but having the dog sniff was a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Holding: Having a trained narcotics detection dog sniff at the front door of a house
following an unverified tip that marijuana was growing inside is a warrantless search
under the Fourth Amendment.
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (Kagan, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: The Florida Supreme Court contravened Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
precedent by holding that the alert by a narcotics detection dog was insufficient to
establish probable cause to search a vehicle. A flexible, common-sense, totality of
circumstances test applies.

Holding: An alert by a certified drug-detection dog is presumptively sufficient to establish
probable cause, and the absence of records of a dog’s past performance in the field is not
enough to rebut the presumption of reliability.
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: When officers would arrest someone for a serious offense and take him into
custody, they would take a cheek swab for purposes of analyzing the arrestee's DNA and
entering the DNA profile in a national database. They would conduct this search even
though it was not supported by individualized suspicion of any other wrongdoing. The
Court stated that like fingerprinting, the swab is a minimally invasive police booking
procedure necessary for identification of the arrestee and an accurate assessment of his
dangerousness and criminal history. The dissent noted that this is the first time the Court
has ever upheld a search for which there was no “individualized suspicion” and “‘whose
primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’”

Holding: When, with probable cause, officers arrest someone for a serious offense and take
him into custody, taking a cheek swab for purposes of analyzing the arrestee's DNA and
entering the DNA profile into a national database is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.
8

B.

Fifth Amendment

Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., majority opinion; 8-1)

Summary: The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on the grounds that the
prosecution had failed to prove an element of the crime that, as the Defendant conceded on
appeal and the appellate court held, did not actually exist. The Court stated that to permit a
second trial after a directed verdict of acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have
been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly
superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that, even though innocent, he may
be found guilty. The Court noted that procedural dismissals do not raise similar concerns
because no expectation of finality attaches to them. This was not a dismissal on a
procedural ground, but rather a determination, albeit mistaken, that the state had failed to
prove its case. “Evans’s acquittal was the product of an ‘erroneous interpretatio[n] of
governing legal principles,’ but . . . that error affects only ‘the accuracy of [the]
determination’ to acquit, not ‘its essential character.’”
Holding: Retrial is barred under the Double Jeopardy clause of the Constitution when the
trial judge directs a verdict of acquittal based on the prosecutor’s failure to prove an
element of the crime charged that does not actually exist.

Significance: This decision resolves in favor of defendants a split of opinion on the
question whether a defendant may be retried after a trial judge has directed a verdict of not
guilty based on the prosecution’s failure to prove an element of the crime that does not
actually exist.

Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (5-4; agreement on judgment only)
(Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, J.; Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment; Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, J.J., dissenting)
Summary: The Defendant submitted voluntarily to police questioning. He was not in
custody, so Miranda warnings were neither required nor given. When asked an
incriminating question, the Defendant was silent. At trial, the prosecutor cited that silence
as evidence of guilt.
Plurality: The prosecutor’s action did not violate the Fifth Amendment because, when
asked the incriminating question, the Defendant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege. Although “‘no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege,’ [] a
witness does not do so by simply standing mute.”
Concurrence: The Defendant’s “claim would fail even if he had invoked the privilege
because the prosecutor's comments regarding his pre-custodial silence did not compel him
to give self-incriminating testimony.”
Dissent: Under the circumstances, one may “fairly infer” that Defendant’s silence was “an
exercise of the Fifth Amendment's privilege.” The prosecutor was prohibited “from
commenting on [that] silence.”
9

C.

Sixth Amendment

Boyer v. Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1702 (2013)

Summary: In this order the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. The question presented was whether a state’s failure to fund counsel for an
indigent Defendant for five years, particularly where the failure was the direct result of the
prosecutor’s choice to seek the death penalty, must be weighed against the state for speedy
trial purposes. The dismissal order after full briefing and oral argument is unexplained, but
seven justices expressed their views. Four dissenting justices would have the delay in this
situation weighed against the state. Three concurring justices believe that the factual
premise of the question was not established, since much of the delay resulted from
defense-requested continuances of hearings on funding issues, and the Defendant
ultimately benefitted from the delay.
Significance: The dismissal leaves Boyer’s conviction in place, makes no law, and has no
precedential value.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (Kagan, J., majority opinion; 7-2)

Summary: When Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1977,
pled guilty to mail fraud in 2004, she was unaware of the immigration consequences of her
plea, and her attorney did not advise her of them. Immigration officials initiated removal
proceedings against her in 2009 based on the mail fraud conviction. While Petitioner was
attempting to overturn that conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty
pleas. Under Teague v. Lane, a new procedural rule does not apply retroactively to disturb a
final conviction. The issue was whether the Padilla holding constituted a new rule rather
than merely the application of the existing rule on ineffective assistance to a new situation.

Holding: Because the question of whether the Sixth Amendment requires attorneys to
inform clients of collateral consequences of convictions such as deportation was still an
open question before Padilla, the Court’s rule in that case was a new rule. Therefore, it
does not apply retroactively to the Petitioner’s earlier conviction.

Significance: As the majority treated this case as an ordinary application of the
retroactivity rule, there is little reason to think this decision will have great impact on
either the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence or on immigration law. It does add certainty
to many plea deals entered into prior to Padilla.
Hodge v. Kentucky, 133 S. Ct. 506 (2012)

Summary: Justice Sotomayor dissented from the denial of certiorari, urging that the
Kentucky Supreme Court erred in concluding that Hodge would have been sentenced to
death anyway because even if the mitigating evidence at issue had been presented, it would
10

not have “explained” his action. Mitigation evidence need not, and rarely could, “explain” a
heinous crime, rather mitigation evidence allows a jury to make a reasoned moral decision
on whether the individual defendant deserves to be executed or to be shown mercy.
Requiring that there be a nexus between evidence in mitigation and the crime’s
commission is contrary to prior precedents in Smith v. Texas (2004) and other cases where
troubled and abused backgrounds were relevant mitigating evidence in violent offense
prosecutions.
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (Thomas, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: In Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), the Court upheld a federal statute
that increased the minimum sentence if a firearm was brandished during a violent or drugtrafficking crime. The statute also made the issue of brandishing a determination to be
made by the sentencing judge based on a preponderance of the evidence, including facts
not subject to the Constitution’s indictment, jury, and proof requirements. In readdressing
that issue here, the Court overruled Harris and stated that any fact that increases the
mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the offense that must be submitted to the
jury, charged in the indictment, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Holding: The decision in Harris is overruled.
D.

Jury Instructions

Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714 (2013) (Scalia, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Defendant relied on the defense to a charge of conspiracy that he had
withdrawn from the conspiracy more than five years before the indictment, which was the
period of limitations for such a conspiracy. The trial court instructed the jury that the
Defendant needed to prove that he withdrew from the conspiracy outside the statute of
limitations by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court ruled that placing the burden of
proof on the Defendant did not offend due process because the defense does not negate an
element of the crime, but only excuses conduct that would otherwise be punishable.
Congress could have placed the burden on the government but did not, and thus, the
common law approach of placing the burden of affirmative defenses on the defendant
applies.

Holding: Withdrawal from a conspiracy outside the statute of limitations period is an
affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

Significance: When charged with a conspiracy that began before the period of limitations
but continued beyond it, a defendant asserting a withdrawal defense has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he withdrew from the conspiracy before
the period of limitations.
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Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720 (2013) (Scalia, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Petitioner Sekhar was convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act for
threatening to expose an alleged affair by the general counsel of the State Comptroller of
New York. The general counsel had recommended that the Comptroller not invest in a fund
managed by Sekhar’s firm, and Sekhar sought to force the general counsel to reverse that
recommendation. The Act defines extortion to mean “the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent” induced by particular kinds of wrongful threats. The property
alleged to have been sought by Sekhar was the general counsel’s recommendation to
approve the investment.
Holding: Attempting to compel an investment recommendation does not constitute “the
obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act.
Significance: There is now one fewer way to be convicted of a certain kind of blackmail.
E.

Due Process

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: The Court stated that using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that are in effect at
the time of sentencing, rather than those in effect at the time of the offense, creates a
significant risk that the defendant will receive a longer sentence when the newer guidelines
provide for a higher sentencing range than those in place at the time of the offense. Finding
an ex post facto violation does not undo the Booker advisory sentence scheme.
Holding: A sentencing court violates the ex post facto clause by using the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than those in effect at the time of the
offense, when the newer guidelines provide for a higher sentencing range than the version
in place at the time of the offense
Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: In a case of first impression in 2001, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized
that a 1975 state statute had abolished the diminished-capacity defense, overruling 26
years of lower court precedent. The Defendant, who had relied on this defense in his
original trial prior to this decision, was barred from using the defense in his retrial after
this decision. In denying habeas relief, the Court stated that this recognition was not an
“unreasonable application of” U.S. Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence under the
federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That jurisprudence forecloses "unexpected and
indefensible" changes in common-law doctrines; it was not unreasonable for the Michigan
Court to find this was not so unforseeable.
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United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: A magistrate judge advised Defendant, in a tax case, to plead guilty to avoid a
longer sentence. The court below ruled that the magistrate judge improperly participated
in plea negotiations in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1), rendering the Defendant's
guilty plea invalid. The Court concluded that the judicial participation did not in itself
demand automatic vacatur of the plea. The reviewing court must consider all the facts and
assess the impact of this error on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty.
Holding: Judicial participation in plea negotiations does not automatically require vacatur
of a defendant's guilty plea unless the error prejudiced the defendant.
F.

Federal Appellate Practice

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121 (2013) (Breyer, J., majority opinion; 6-3)

Summary: When the governing law is unsettled at the time of trial, but settled in the
defendant’s favor by the time of appeal, an appellate court reviewing for “plain error”
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (b) should use the time-of-appeal standard when assessing
whether the lower court’s ruling was plainly wrong.

Holding: Plain error relief is available if the error was plain at the time of trial or at the
time of appeal.
Ryan v. Schad, 133 S. Ct. 2548 (2013) (per curiam)

Summary: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed a mandate denying relief in a capital
case after granting an en banc rehearing in another case that raised the same legal issue.
Under Fed. R. App. Proc. 41(d)(2)(D), a court should only stay a mandate under
extraordinary circumstances. This was not an extraordinary circumstance, so the appellate
court abused its discretion in staying the mandate.
Holding: The grant of en banc rehearing in another case raising the same issue is not an
“extraordinary circumstance” allowing a federal circuit court to stay issuance of a mandate
denying relief in a capital case.
G.

Deportation and Convictions

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., majority opinion; 7-2)

Summary: Part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.,
provides that a noncitizen who has been convicted of an "aggravated felony" may be
removed from the United States, and the Act bars the Attorney General from granting
discretionary relief from removal to an aggravated felon. The Court says here, "[i]f a
noncitizen's conviction for a marijuana distribution offense fails to establish that the
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offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, the
conviction is not for an aggravated felony under the INA."

Holding: A person convicted of a state illicit drug trafficking offense that involved the
"social sharing of a small amount of marijuana" is not necessarily barred from obtaining
discretionary relief from removal under the INA.
H.

Criminal Legislation

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (Kagan, J., majority opinion; 8-1)

Summary: Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the modified categorical approach allows
a judge to consult certain extra-statutory documents, such as the indictment, jury
instructions, or the record of a plea colloquy, to determine whether the nature of a prior
conviction qualifies it as a predicate for a recidivist sentence enhancement.
Holding: When a statute of conviction contains a single, indivisible set of offense elements
and covers both qualifying and non-qualifying offenses, a conviction under that statute
cannot be subjected to the modified categorical approach.
I.

Federal Habeas Corpus Cases

Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) (Thomas, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Inmates appealing state death sentences to federal court have a right to a
lawyer, but the courts have never said whether the inmates have to be mentally competent
enough to help their lawyers with their federal appeals. Gonzales and Carter argued that
federal judges have discretion to hold up proceedings indefinitely until the inmates are
ready. The Court said that “‘at some point, the state must be allowed to defend its judgment
of conviction.’” It further stated that “[f]or purposes of resolving these cases, it is
unnecessary to determine the precise contours of the district court's discretion to issue
stays. We address only its outer limits.” In Gonzales’s case, the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in denying a stay after finding that Gonzales’s claims were all record-based or
resolvable as a matter of law, regardless of his competence. Review of a petitioner’s recordbased claims subject to § 2254(d) is limited to the record before the state court that heard
the case on the merits; thus, any additional evidence that Gonzales might have would be
inadmissible. In Carter’s case, three of his claims did not warrant a stay because they were
adjudicated on the merits in state post-conviction proceedings and subject to review under
§ 2254(d). Thus, extra-record evidence that he might have concerning these claims would
be inadmissible. It is unclear from the record whether he exhausted his fourth claim. If it
was exhausted, it too would be record-based. But even if it was both unexhausted and not
procedurally defaulted, an indefinite stay would be inappropriate because such a stay
would permit petitioners to “frustrate [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996’s] goal of finality by dragging out indefinitely their federal habeas review.”
14

Holding: A federal judge cannot indefinitely delay a death row inmate's federal appeals to
see if the convict can become mentally competent enough to help his lawyer.
Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013) (Alito, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: When a state appellate court’s opinion addresses some issues but omits
mention of a federal constitutional claim raised before it, a rebuttable presumption arises
that the constitutional claim was decided on its merits. Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the federal courts may not grant habeas relief
to prisoners whose claims have already been adjudicated on the merits unless the state
court decision is contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law or is an
unreasonable interpretation of the facts. Thus, under AEDPA, a federal habeas court must
treat an unaddressed constitutional claim as if the state court had ruled on the claim for
purposes of this deference.
Holding: Unless the presumption that a constitutional claim was decided on the merits is
rebutted, the federal courts must apply deference under AEDPA.
Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990 (2013) (per curiam)

Summary: The Nevada trial court excluded extrinsic evidence that the sexual-assault
complainant had previously made false accusations against the Defendant. The Nevada
Supreme Court’s affirmance was not an unreasonable application of any United States
Supreme Court decision. “‘[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the
Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.’” “Only rarely have
we held that the right to present a complete defense was violated by the exclusion of
defense evidence under a state rule of evidence.” Supreme Court cases do not “clearly
establish that the Constitution requires a case-by-case balancing of” the defendant’s right to
present a defense and the “interests” served by a state rule requiring the defendant to file
written notice of his intent to introduce extrinsic evidence for impeachment. The Supreme
Court “has never held that the Confrontation Clause entitles a criminal defendant to
introduce extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes.” The Court stated that by
characterizing Supreme Court “cases as recognizing a broad right to present ‘evidence
bearing on [a witness's] credibility,’” the Ninth Circuit erroneously framed “our precedents
at a [too] high level of generality.”
Holding: The grant of habeas relief was reversed because there is no clearly established
constitutional right to use extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes.
Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1990 (2013) (per curiam)

Summary: California has a rule allowing trial judges discretion to deny mid-trial requests
to begin or to terminate self-representation. The Court stated that this rule is not contrary
to or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court law.
The Ninth Circuit relied excessively on its own decisions and the decisions of other circuits
in identifying the “clearly established” legal principles.
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Holding: The Court summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of relief in a non-capital
habeas case because the California rule did not violate any laws clearly established by
United States Supreme Court case law.
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: A “convincing showing of actual innocence” under the standard of Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), entitles a petitioner to an equitable exception to the statute of
limitations for a federal habeas petition. There is no separate diligence requirement, but
unexplained delay may reduce the convincing power of the evidence of innocence. The
Court believes it unlikely that Perkins’s showing of innocence is sufficient to meet the
“demanding” Schlup standard.

Holding: Actual innocence can overcome the statute of limitations for habeas petitions, but
the court can consider unexplained delay as a factor in determining whether the petitioner
has shown actual innocence.
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (Breyer, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Background: In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), the Court held that the defendant
in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, but who has a state-law right to raise such a
claim in the first post-conviction proceeding, can argue that the denial of post-conviction
assistance of counsel, or the ineffective assistance of first post-conviction counsel,
constitutes “cause” to excuse a default with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim raised in post-conviction. The state can then argue that the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim is insubstantial and that there is no “prejudice” as required
to excuse the default. This is a narrow exception to the earlier rule from Coleman v.
Thompson that an attorney’s ignorance of inadvertence in a post-conviction proceeding
does not constitute cause, and the Court held that inadequate assistance at initial-review
collateral proceedings may indeed establish cause. The Court declined to resolve the
question of whether a prisoner has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
in initial-review collateral proceedings.

Summary: The Martinez rule applies where state law says that ineffective assistance of
counsel (IAC) claims must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding. The holding
also applies where state law does not require IAC to be raised first in collateral review, but
where “[t]he structure and design of the [state] system in actual operation, however, make
it ‘virtually impossible’ for an ineffective assistance claim to be presented on direct review.”
Here, while Texas permits IAC claims before the trial court in a motion for a new trial, this
vehicle is often inadequate because of time constraints and because the trial record has
generally not been transcribed at this point. The rule from Martinez that the ineffective
assistance of first post-conviction counsel can constitute cause for procedural default of a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel also applies in Texas and other states where
the “state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly
unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a
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claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,” even if (unlike in Arizona)
it is theoretically possible to raise an IAC claim on direct appeal.

Holding: In cases where the state procedural framework makes it virtually impossible to
bring an IAC claim on initial direct review, the Martinez rule applies. Ineffective assistance
of first post-conviction counsel can constitute cause to excuse a default on the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim.

III.

REGULATION
A.

Administrative Law

City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (Scalia, J., majority opinion; 6-3)

Summary: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires states and localities to act
“within a reasonable period of time” after the filing of an application to build a wireless
tower. It also authorizes the FCC to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in the public interest to carry out” the Act. Pursuant to those provisions, the FCC
promulgated a regulation requiring states and localities to rule on wireless tower siting
applications within no more than 150 days. The goal of the authorizing statute and the FCC
regulation is to prevent the NIMBY syndrome from obstructing development of the national
wireless network. Affected localities disputed the FCC’s position that the Act authorized the
agency to adopt the regulation.
Holding: The Court upheld the FCC rule. More important, the Court held that under the
Chevron doctrine, courts must defer to agencies’ constructions of ambiguous provisions of
their statutes even where the agencies interpret the scope of their own authority.

Significance: The majority opinion resolves the deference issue as most observers
probably expected. The real significance may be the dissent, in which Chief Justice Roberts
insisted that a court may not defer to an agency interpretation until the court
independently decides whether Congress has delegated the agency authority to make law
with respect to the specific statutory provision at issue. This could portent a major shift of
policymaking (political) authority from agencies, which are accountable to an elected
President, to courts, which are accountable to no one.
B.

Environmental Law

Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (Kennedy, J.,
majority opinion; 7-1)

Summary: The logging company was channeling polluted stormwater into waterways via
channels, culverts, and ditches alongside its logging roads. The environmental organization,
NEDC, challenged its ability to do so without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit under the Clean Water Act, which is required for any point source
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that discharges a pollutant into the waters of the United States. There is an exception to
permitting requirements applicable to discharge made up entirely of stormwater, but that
exception does not apply if the discharge is associated with industrial activity. NEDC
argued that the logging company was not entitled to the stormwater exception because it
was channeled as a result of industrial activity (logging). The EPA regulations defined
industrial activity as “manufacturing, processing, or raw materials storage areas at an
industrial plant.” In this case, the EPA had interpreted this definition not to include logging,
which it deemed merely the harvesting of raw materials. The Court found this to be a
reasonable interpretation, especially in light of the deference to be accorded to agencies in
interpreting their own regulations and the fact that the interpretation did not depart from
prior interpretations.
Holding: The Clean Water Act and the EPA’s implementing regulations do not require
NPDES permits before channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads can be discharged
into the navigable waters of the United States.

Significance: This allows logging companies to continue permit-free alteration of the
landscape in a manner that directs polluted stormwater into streams and rivers when it
might otherwise have been absorbed into the ground and filtered. The primary ecological
issue is the high sediment content, which is harmful to fish and other aquatic species. In
reality, though, this is nothing new.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (Alito, J.,
majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: This is perhaps the most controversial of the Court’s recent “takings trilogy.” It
expands substantially the reach of two prior developer-friendly cases, Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Those cases held that for a land-use permit to be conditioned on the owner’s
relinquishment of a portion of his property, there must be a nexus and rough
proportionality between that demand and the impact of the proposed land use. The facts in
Koontz were a bit different, in that he was denied a permit (as opposed to granted one after
being forced to hand over part of his property), and the condition he failed to meet was
entirely monetary (contributing to an offset). As a result, the lower courts did not agree on
how to apply the existing doctrine, and the Court took up the issue.
Holding: Denying a permit for failure to meet an unconstitutional condition is just as
invalid as granting one under force of such a condition, although no property has been
taken. Conditioning permits on payment into an offsite mitigation project is subject to the
Nollan/Dolan standard, just as requiring real property would be. Denial of the Koontz
permit application is invalid.

Significance: This case may have a major impact on mitigation requirements for
environmentally harmful development. It has been celebrated by landowners/developers
and criticized by environmentalists. Extending constitutional takings doctrine to
requirements of offsite mitigation could be a real game-changer in the protection of
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vulnerable wetlands and other ecosystems. That said, it is important to note that it does not
hold offsite mitigation requirements (which are quite common) unconstitutional, but
merely requires the Nollan/Dolan nexus be applied, which keeps it from being a total wipeout.
Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
710 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous Court)
Summary: The District operates a “municipal separate storm sewer system” (MS4), which
is a drainage system that collects, transports, and discharges storm water. The Clean Water
Act (CWA) and its implementing regulations require certain MS4 operators to obtain a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit before discharging storm
water into navigable waters. The District has the necessary permit for its MS4.
Environmental organizations brought suit alleging that water-quality monitoring in the
area demonstrated violations of this permit. The Ninth Circuit held the District liable for
polluted water that flowed out of the concrete-lined portions of the rivers, where the
monitoring stations are located, into lower, unlined portions of the same rivers. This sort of
spillage fell at the borderline of what the CWA defines as discharge of a pollutant, resulting
in a need for clarification of the issue.
Holding: The flow of water from an improved portion of a navigable waterway into an
unimproved portion of the same waterway does not qualify as a “discharge of a pollutant”
under the CWA.
Significance: While hardly a surprising outcome, it does expand the variety of ways in
which water can be polluted with no responsible entity.

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., for a
unanimous Court)

Summary: This case deals with water rights among several states party to a
congressionally-approved interstate compact. Among other things, the compact set forth
limits on upstream water use for a particular waterway in order to ensure adequate water
for the downstream state of Louisiana. A Texas district wished to withdraw water it
deemed to be beyond Oklahoma’s allocated share (and thus “unallocated”) from within
Oklahoma’s borders, in violation of Oklahoma state law. The District filed suit in federal
court at the same time as it requested the permit (knowing it would be denied as
impermissible under state law), alleging that the state law was preempted by the compact
and was also a violation of the dormant commerce clause, in that it discriminated against
interstate commerce in water. Unfortunately for the Texas district, the compact provides
that it should not “be deemed to ... [i]nterfere with or impair the right or power of any
Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the appropriation, use, and control of
water, or quality of water, not inconsistent with its obligations under this Compact.”
Although the compact also contains language providing “equal rights” among the signatory
states to a certain portion of the water flow, which provides the main basis of the District’s
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argument, both Oklahoma and the federal courts interpret this only as a right to withdraw
water within a state’s own boundaries.

Holding: The District failed on both counts. The compact did not create any cross-border
rights to water. It was at best ambiguous regarding whether the percentage of water one
state was permitted to withdraw could be drawn outside its borders, and more likely had
envisioned no such permission, due to traditional principles of state sovereignty. Nor was
there a violation of the dormant commerce clause, as none of the water accessible in
Oklahoma could accurately be described as unallocated water available to other states – it
was allocated to Oklahoma subject to the restrictions on the quantity the state could
withdraw.

Significance: While this case is tailored to the circumstances (most of it is basic contract
interpretation of the compact), and thus primarily impacts the parties to the compact at
issue (and especially Oklahoma, whose state statute’s constitutionality was at issue), it does
provide some clarity for future issues arising under interstate compacts. In order for a state
law to be preempted by a congressionally-approved interstate compact, the conflict will
need to be clear. If the state law fits within an ambiguity in the compact, it will likely
receive deference under this case. The Court also rejects the dormant commerce clause
argument by focusing entirely on the District’s erroneous interpretation of the compact;
thus the case has little precedential value as there is no discussion of broader issues
regarding water rights and interstate commerce.
C.

Health Law

Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: The Plaintiff was a veteran who sought treatment for cataracts at a Navy
hospital. After suffering injury, he sued the United States for battery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that he withdrew his consent just before surgery.
Although the FTCA excepts battery from its waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h), the Gonzalez Act, which establishes that in suits against armed forces medical
personnel, a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is against the United States, 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a),
carves out an exception to that general rule under the FTCA and allows plaintiffs to recover
from the United States for a “negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of
medical . . . functions,” 10 U.S.C. § 1089(e). The United States argued that this provision
was intended simply to reinforce the government’s immunity, but the Court held that the
government’s interpretation of the statute required “a reading most unnatural.” Levin, 133
S. Ct. at 1232. The Court also stated that had Congress meant what the government claimed
it meant, Congress would have used different language, as it did in other parts of the
Gonzalez Act and in other parts of the Code. Id. at 1232-33.
Holding: The Gonzalez Act removes actions against armed forces medical personnel from
the protection of the intentional tort exception in the FTCA; thus, the Plaintiff can bring suit
against the United States for the alleged medical battery by a Navy doctor.
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Significance: This decision corrects a serious unintended consequence brought about by
the lower court decisions. Specifically, the Court’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
corrects the prior unequal treatment of individuals who sue over the violation of informedconsent under FTCA. The FTCA’s purpose is to remove the Government’s sovereign
immunity against tort suits: this Act does not actually establish and define the causes of
tort actions against the Government. These causes of action are determined by state law.
Conditions under which patients can successfully sue doctors for informed-consent
violations differ from one state to another. Some states allow patients to proceed on a
regular negligence theory. On the other hand, some states allow patients to sue doctors for
informed-consent violations only on battery or assault theories. Adoption of the
government’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) would therefore have created an
intolerable “venue discrimination” between patients receiving medical treatment in
different military facilities. Under the lower court decisions, patients who received care in
those states that only allow assault/battery theories for pursing a cause of action for
breach of informed consent had their causes of action barred. In contrast, those who
received care in states that allowed a negligence theory could proceed with their causes of
action.
Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., for a
unanimous Court)

Summary: Plaintiffs are medical care providers who are appealing reimbursement awards
that were determined more than 10 years earlier. Plaintiffs provide inpatient medical care
to Medicare beneficiaries. They are reimbursed at a fixed rate per patient, with this
amount adjusted upward for providers that serve a disproportionate number of lowincome patients. Their reimbursements for those services are calculated annually by a
fiscal intermediary. For several years, Plaintiffs’ reimbursements were calculated
incorrectly, to their detriment, because the fiscal intermediary was provided with
inaccurate data by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) on the rates of
low-income patients the Plaintiffs treated. In the normal course, a provider who is
dissatisfied with the intermediary’s reimbursement award can appeal that award to the
Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) within 180 days of the receipt of the
reimbursement letter. In 1974, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated a
regulation, through notice and comment rulemaking, allowing the PRRB to extend the time
for appeal up to three years upon a showing of good cause. Because Plaintiffs were not
made aware of the errors in their reimbursements for more than a decade, Plaintiffs
requested that the doctrine of equitable tolling be applied. Under the doctrine of equitable
tolling, the period for filing an action may be extended when a party "despite all due
diligence . . . is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim." In
this case, the data upon which the amount of this reimbursement is based was exclusively
within the possession of the government. Plaintiffs alleged that they only became aware of
these deficiencies as a result of publication of a separate decision in Baystate Medical
Center v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company. In Baystate, it was revealed that CMS
systemically understated for all providers the numbers of SSI-entitled patients in its
calculations, which resulted in an underpayment to the hospitals. CMS was aware of these
deficiencies and did not correct them.
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The Court ruled that because Congress did not intend the 180-day time limit for appeal to
be jurisdictional, the Secretary did have the authority to promulgate the regulation
allowing the PRRB to extend the time for appeal. However, the doctrine of equitable tolling
does not apply because the presumption of equitable tolling has never before applied to
internal agency appeal deadlines and to do so in this instance would "essentially gut" the
Secretary's regulation. Further, allowing for equitable tolling here would undermine the
Secretary’s determination that the three-year outer limit on appeals is necessary to allow
the PRRB to work through its caseload and keep the reimbursement process running
smoothly. Finally, Congress amended this statute six times since the three-year outer limit
on appeals was promulgated and left that regulation untouched all six times.
Holding: Equitable tolling does not apply to the statute at issue, so the Plaintiffs’ appeals of
reimbursement determinations more than 10 years after they were issued were not timely
filed.

Significance: Of immediate significance, this decision effectively ends dozens of pending
lawsuits with billions of dollars in potential liability for miscalculated Medicare
reimbursements. In the long run, while it appears that the precise issue addressed in this
case was narrow, it has potentially far reaching implications due to the Supreme Court's
suggestion that equitable tolling will not normally be permitted in administrative actions.
This ruling also raises basic issues of fairness. The hospitals were deprived of the chance to
exercise their appellate rights due to the government's alleged concealment of the errors in
computing the payments owed to the hospital. This case leaves many with the question of
whether the government should be permitted to profit from what were allegedly deliberate
acts of concealment.

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (Alito, J., majority opinion; 54)
Summary: Plaintiff was severely injured from a negative reaction to the generic drug
sulindac manufactured by Defendant. She sued for design defect and argued that, under
New Hampshire law, Defendant should have provided stronger warnings. Once a brandname drug has filed a full New Drug Application which has been approved by the FDA, a
lengthy and expensive process, a generic manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) in which it asserts that the proposed drug: 1) has the same active
ingredient(s), dosage, strength, and delivery method as the brand-name drug; 2) is
bioequivalent to the brand-name drug; and 3) has the same labeling as that approved for
the brand-name drug. Once a generic drug is approved, the manufacturer is prohibited
from making any major changes to, inter alia, the drug’s label. Defendant received
authorization from the FDA to manufacture the generic sulindac after filing an ANDA.
Because Defendant was prohibited under federal law from making any changes to
sulindac’s label, it would have been impossible for Defendant to also comply with the
stronger labeling requirement that arose under New Hampshire’s design defect law.
Although Defendant could have avoided this conflict by opting not to sell sulindac in New
Hampshire, this stop-selling option is insufficient to defeat a claim for preemption.
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Holding: To the extent that it would have required Defendant to alter its drug label in
violation of federal law, the New Hampshire warning-based design defect law is preempted
by federal law, and Defendant cannot be held liable for design defect under New Hampshire
law.

Significance: Under the FDA's premarket testing regime, to date, serious adverse effects
were not detected for approximately one-half of the drugs on the market until after the
drugs received regulatory approval and were made available to the general population.
Under current rules, brand-name drug makers can change their labels to warn about these
serious new risks without FDA approval, while generic drug makers cannot. This problem
is critically important as generic drugs have become immensely popular over the past few
decades. Last year 80% of prescriptions filled in the U.S. were for generic drugs. A generic
manufacturer can only change product labeling if ordered by the FDA to do so or if the
generic drug’s brand-name equivalent has already made a similar change. Of note is that
there are 434 generic drugs for which no comparable brand-name product exists. The
result of the Supreme Court's decision in Bartlett is that the manufactures of 80% of the
drugs on the market are insulated against liability for inadequate labeling. Branded drugs,
in contrast, are liable if a product's safety label is inadequate. This causes a "regulatory
gap" between generic and brand-name product safety. To deal with this serious problem,
the FDA has issued proposed new rules that will allow generic manufacturers to change
their labels. The proposed new rule will make generic and brand-name producers equal
with respect to their obligation to update safety labeling as new information is discovered
about serious health risks. Many hope that, when finalized, this new rule will provide much
needed protection to the tens of millions of people who regularly use generic drugs.
Wos v. E.M.A, 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion; 6-3)

Summary: Plaintiff, a Medicaid beneficiary, suffered numerous birth defects. With her
parents, she settled with the delivering doctor and hospital; the value of the settlement was
not apportioned between medical expenses and other damages. Federal law requires
states to recover monies received by Medicaid beneficiaries when those monies are
designated as payments for medical expenses that were paid by Medicaid; however, federal
law also bars states from placing liens on the property of Medicaid beneficiaries to recover
Medicaid payments. When a beneficiary obtains a settlement or jury verdict, the
beneficiary is viewed as having a property interest in the value of that settlement or verdict
that is not apportioned specifically to medical expenses. North Carolina established a
statutory presumption that one-third of any settlement or jury verdict award was
attributable to medical expenses, up to the value actually paid by Medicaid. This one-third
allocation is arbitrary and will often have the effect of allowing the state to recover monies
that were not designated as medical payments. This is in direct conflict with the federal
law prohibiting states from placing Medicaid liens on beneficiaries’ property. In instances
of lump-sum settlement awards or jury verdicts, the state must develop some process for
accurately allocating the amount recovered.
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Holding: North Carolina’s statute presuming that one-third of any settlement or jury
verdict is allocable to medical expenses is in direct conflict with, and therefore preempted
by, the federal Medicaid anti-lien provision.

Significance: Of immediate significance, the holding of this case prohibits states from
allocating an arbitrarily high percentage of a Medicaid beneficiary’s settlement or jury
verdict and using these awards as a source of revenue for closing budget deficits. The
larger question many are asking is whether this decision will have a broader impact on the
long-running debate over the ability of beneficiaries of “Spending Clause” statutes, like
Medicaid, to obtain a remedy in court for state violations of their statutory rights. For a
long period of time, it appeared that avenues were steadily being foreclosed for private
enforcement of such federal statutory mandates against the states. In other words, if states
ignored federal law requirements, the federal government could withhold monies, but
whether individuals who received Medicaid benefits, or doctors treating these patients,
could sue states for noncompliance has been the subject of great debate. By upholding the
Constitution’s directive that conflicting state laws are displaced by federal law, will this
case provide the support for private causes of action to force state compliance with federal
requirements, such as those set forth in Affordable Care Act, known as Obama Care?
Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Plaintiff began suffering initial symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) not long
after receiving the final dose of the Hepatitis B vaccine, but was not immediate diagnosed
with MS and did not learn of the connection between the Hepatitis B vaccine and MS until
later still. Upon learning of the connection, she filed a petition for compensation under the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA). Although the NCVIA requires that all
petitions be filed within 36 months of the initial onset of the symptoms, Plaintiff argued
that the filing time should have been equitably tolled, but ultimately lost on that issue. The
NCVIA prohibits attorneys from charging fees to clients for bringing petitions under it, but
it provides for attorney fees to be awarded on successful petitions automatically and on
unsuccessful petitions when those petitions were brought in good faith and with a
reasonable basis. Here the petition was “filed” under the NCVIA because the petition was
delivered to the Court of Federal Claims, which accordingly forwarded the claim for
assignment to a Special Master. This action meets the ordinary definition of filed, and no
other portion of the NCVIA relies on a special definition of filed. Further, the NCVIA does
not cross-reference the limitations provision in the attorney fees provision, but it does
expressly cross-reference other provisions with the limitations provision.

Holding: The NCVIA unambiguously allows the award of attorney fees for an unsuccessful
petition that was untimely filed so long as the petition was filed in good faith and with a
reasonable basis.

Significance: As is often the case in vaccine injury compensation cases, determining when
the limitations period begins to run is fact-based and often unclear. Although symptomatic,
petitioners often do not know that their illness or injury could be associated with a vaccine
they received until they receive a definitive diagnosis. Petitioners also may not know or
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realize at the time that initial symptoms are related to their ultimate diagnosis. Therefore,
a petitioner may file a petition in good faith believing he is within the limitations period but
later have the court find that he had symptoms that fall outside the limitations period
resulting in the claim being dismissed. Because of the holding in Sebelius v. Cloer,
petitioners in that situation will still be able to petition for attorney’s fees and costs. This
means that petitioners with good faith claims but potential timeliness issues will still be
able to find an attorney willing to take their cases.
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., for a
unanimous Court)

Summary: Georgia state law allows political subdivisions to establish hospital authorities
to operate and maintain healthcare facilities throughout the state. The goal is to aid the
state in its duty to provide healthcare services to the indigent. These bodies are authorized
to exercise any powers necessary to achieve the law’s goals, including, inter alia,
purchasing, leasing, building, and repairing facilities. The hospital authorities are not
authorized to operate for profit. The hospital authority in this case operated one of two
hospitals in a county, and, combined, those hospitals accounted for the vast majority of
acute medical services provided in the several surrounding counties. The hospital
authority planned to acquire the second hospital, and the FTC filed an administrative
complaint alleging that this plan would substantially reduce competition in the market for
acute medical services and create a virtual monopoly in violation of antitrust laws.

The hospital authority argued that it was immune from antitrust liability under the stateaction doctrine, which immunizes local governments and non-governmental entities
carrying out state regulatory functions from antitrust liability for actions that are the
foreseeable result of state legislation. A result is foreseeable if the legislature is authorizing
the entity to act in a way that is inherently anticompetitive. This immunity is disfavored
and is thus applied narrowly. The Georgia statute neither expressly states that it intends
the act to have anticompetitive effects, nor demonstrates that the legislature affirmatively
contemplated it having an anticompetitive effect. The statute generally grants hospital
authorities the same powers as private corporations, and, because those powers are not
usually used anticompetitively, the grant of those powers alone does not demonstrate that
the legislature contemplated that they would be used anticompetitively. Further, none of
the other specific goals of hospital authorities or restrictions placed on hospital authorities
show that the legislature intended for the hospital authorities to act anticompetitively.
Thus, anticompetitive actions were not a foreseeable result of the legislation.

Holding: The Georgia legislature did not clearly articulate an intention to allow hospital
authorities to act anticompetitively, so they are not immune from antitrust liability under
the state-action doctrine.

Significance: The Court clarified that the state-action doctrine should apply narrowly
when sub-state and non-state actors claim immunity from antitrust liability. Citing the
amici brief filed by 20 states in support of the FTC's position, the Court reasoned that loose
application of the clear-articulation test would "attach significant unintended
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consequences to local bodies, effectively requiring states to disclaim any intent to displace
competition to avoid inadvertently authorizing anticompetitive conduct." Of interest to the
debate over the merits of the special treatment that hospitals in many states receive as a
result of claiming non-profit status, the hospital authority, which was the respondent in the
case, argued, inter alia, that it should get lighter antitrust treatment because, since it is a
nonprofit, it is unlikely that it will use the merger to engage in antitrust activity. This case
adds to the discussion over whether a more lax antitrust regime is justified for nonprofits;
certainly, this case raises questions over whether nonprofits will systematically act in ways
that are more pro-consumer than their for-profit counterparts.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (Breyer, J., majority opinion; 5-3)

Summary: In bringing a new drug to market, the brand-name manufacturer must submit a
New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for review and approval, which involves a long,
costly testing process. Once a brand-name drug has been approved, the Hatch-Waxman
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, allows a would-be generic manufacturer of the same drug to rely on the
approval already given to the brand-name drug by submitting an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) that requires the generic to certify, inter alia, that its drug has the same
active ingredient(s), dose, strength, and delivery method as, and is the bioequivalent of the
brand-name drug. The generic manufacturer must also certify that any patents claimed in
the brand-name’s NDA either have expired or will expire, will not be infringed, or are
invalid. Claiming that a patent is invalid or will not be infringed automatically counts as
patent infringement. If the patent-holder brings an infringement suit within 45 days, the
FDA must withhold approval of the generic for 30 months before approving the generic,
unless the dispute is resolved in favor of the generic manufacturer before then. The first
generic manufacturer to file an ANDA and certify that a patent is invalid or will not be
infringed enjoys a 180-day exclusivity period which begins to run on the day when that
manufacturer begins to market the generic drug. This exclusivity period can prove
extremely valuable (possibly as much as several hundred million dollars) to the generic
manufacturer who, during that period, has the exclusive right to market a generic version
of that drug.

This has led to the development of reverse payment settlements within the pharmaceutical
industry to resolve these patent disputes. In a reverse payment settlement, in order to end
the patent litigation, the generic manufacturer, the alleged infringer, agrees not to bring the
generic drug to market for a certain period of time-generally less than the time remaining
on the patent. In exchange, the patent-holder agrees to pay the generic manufacturer a
sum of money for each year that the generic is withheld from the market. Because the firstto-file generic manufacturer has the 180-day exclusivity period, which does not begin to
run until that generic manufacturer actually markets the generic product, if the brandname manufacturer enters into such a settlement with that generic manufacturer, the
brand-name manufacturer can keep all competition from generic manufacturers out of the
marketplace. The FTC has filed numerous complaints against companies entering into
these settlements alleging that by agreeing to keep competition out of the market and share
in monopoly profits, these companies are violating multiple antitrust laws. Disparate
outcomes in these cases have led to a circuit split on the validity of these settlements.
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Holding: Reverse settlement payments may be challenged but are not presumptively
illegal. In determining the validity of a reverse payment settlement, a court should take a
“rule of reason” approach and look at the size of the payment, the scale of the payment in
relation to the payor’s anticipated litigation costs, other services which it might represent
payment for, and the lack of any other convincing justification to determine whether it
carries a risk of significant anticompetitive effects. This analysis appropriately balances
the competing concerns at the heart of patent and antitrust laws.

Significance: This decision resolves a circuit split on the correct test to apply to claims that
reverse payment settlements violate antitrust laws. It will likely limit the frequency of
these settlements in the future and, according to the dissent, could decrease the frequency
of settlements generally, particularly in patent cases.

IV.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.

Class Actions

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (Scalia, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the certification of a Rule
23(b)(3) damages class that included more than one million current and former
subscribers to cable-television services. The class alleged that Defendant Comcast
Corporation (Comcast) had engaged in a series of transactions that permitted Comcast to
“cluster” or concentrate its operations in what was referred to as the Philadelphia
Designated Market Area. The class alleged that the clustering violated Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. The class also provided expert testimony that Comcast’s actions
created four different types of antitrust impact and resultant cable subscription price
increases. The District Court certified a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class but only as to one of
the four theories of antitrust impact – the so-called “overbuilder” theory. The District Court
also determined that damages from the overbuilder theory could be calculated on a
classwide basis. The Third Circuit affirmed class certification over Comcast’s objection that
the damages model included all four theories of antitrust impact and not just damages from
the sole theory on which the class was certified. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Holding: Certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) class was improper because the lower court
refused to entertain arguments against certification that would also be pertinent to the
merits inquiry. This, the majority concluded, ran afoul of previous Supreme Court
precedent. The majority took on the task of applying the appropriate certification standard
(a decision with which the dissenting justices took issue) and concluded that the Plaintiff
class fell “far short” of establishing that damages were capable of measurement on a
classwide basis. Instead, according to the majority, “[q]uestions of individual damage
calculations [would] inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.”

Significance: This case may have limited significance, or it may, ultimately, be used to limit
significantly the Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action. The majority opinion emphasized,
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relying inter alia, on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541(2011), that its rejection
of class certification turned on the following established class certification principles: (1) a
party “must affirmatively demonstrate . . . compliance” with Rule 23 requirements, Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52); (2)
Rule 23 “does not set forth a mere pleading standard”; instead, parties must be prepared to
provide evidentiary proof of Rule 23(a) requirements, id. (quoting Dukes, 13 S. Ct. at 255152); and (3) the proof required to certify a class will often overlap with proof on the merits,
id. (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). These same principles, the majority concluded, apply
not just to the Rule 23(a) class action prerequisites, but also to the Rule 23(b)
requirements. The Comcast majority perhaps provided a new twist, stating that, “[if]
anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule
23(a).” Id. The majority’s application of the class certification standard, moreover, seemed
to imply that, to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, the plaintiff must establish that
damages are capable of measurement across the entire class. If so, this could be the death
knell of the Rule 23(b)(3) class.

Perhaps the Court majority did not provide a new twist, though. Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion, in which, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. The
dissenting opinion highlights that the majority’s opinion “breaks no new ground” regarding
class action certification. In particular, the dissent emphasizes, the majority decision
should not be construed to require, as a Rule 23(b)(3) prerequisite, that classwide injury
must be “measurable ‘on a class-wide basis.’” While it is true that “questions of law or fact
common to class members” must “predominate” over questions affecting only individual
class members, this does not mean that, in a Rule 23(b)(3) class, individual damage
calculations preclude Rule 23(b)(3) certification. Instead, the dissent concluded that the
Comcast ruling is “good for this day and case only. In the mine run of cases, it remains the
‘black letter rule’ that a class may obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability
questions common to the class members predominate over damages questions unique to
class members.” Early returns show that the Comcast ruling may, indeed, be “good for
[that] day and case only,” as both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, in cases remanded to them
by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Comcast, have reaffirmed the “black
letter rule.” See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Nos. 11-8029, 12-8030 (7th Cir. Aug. 22,
2013)(Posner, J.) (where, unlike Comcast, a liability-only class action is certified, separate
hearings to determine damages of individual class members or sub-classing to determine
damages of various groups of class members is permissible); Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., No.
10-4188 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013) (class certified for liability purposes only and leaving
damages for later proceedings is within strictures of Supreme Court’s decisions in Amgen
Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) and Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 113 S. Ct. 1426 (2013)).

Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013) (Thomas, J., majority opinion; 54)
Summary: Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
permits employees to file a “collective” action, on behalf of themselves and others
“similarly situated,” for certain violations of the FLSA. In Genesis, Plaintiff Laura Symczyk, a
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registered nurse, filed a collective action in which she alleged that her prior employer,
Genesis HealthCare Corp. (Genesis), violated her rights under the FLSA and those of
similarly situated employees, by uniformly deducting 30 minutes for breaks and mealtimes,
although employees sometimes performed compensable work during those time periods.
Genesis served a Rule 68 offer of judgment on Symczyk that included unpaid wages, and
“such reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses . . . as the Court may determine,” and
stated that the offer would expire within ten days. When Plaintiff Symczyk allowed the
offer to expire, Genesis argued that the case should be dismissed on subject matter
jurisdiction grounds because it had provided an offer of complete relief, and, thus,
Symczyk’s claim was mooted because she retained no personal stake in the litigation.
Symczyk objected that the Rule 68 offer of judgment should not be used to “pick off” named
plaintiffs and prevent a valid collective action for enforcement of FLSA requirements. She
did not argue in the District Court or the Third Circuit what both she and the United States,
as amicus curiae, would argue before the Supreme Court – that her claim had not been
rendered moot because the Rule 68 offer had lapsed without entry of judgment. The
District Court dismissed the action because (1) no other persons had joined the lawsuit;
and (2) the Rule 68 offer of judgment had mooted Symczyk’s suit by providing complete
relief for her claim. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the Rule 68 offer had
mooted Symczyk’s claim, but determining, nevertheless, that the case should be sent back
to the District Court for “conditional certification,” and if such certification were permitted,
for the District Court to relate the certification back to the date of the filing of the
Complaint. Such a “certification” on remand would have had the effect of supplying
additional plaintiffs whose cases were not moot and, thus, of permitting the case to
proceed.
Holding: The Court noted, but failed to resolve, the split in circuits on whether an
unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies a plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to
moot the plaintiff’s claim. Concluding that Plaintiff Symczyk had waived the Rule 68 offerof-judgment issue, the Court assumed that Symczyk’s claim had been rendered moot.
Assuming that the lone plaintiff’s claim had been rendered moot and noting that no other
plaintiff had opted into the action, the Supreme Court held that the purported FLSA
collective action did not remain justiciable because the Plaintiff had “no personal interest in
representing putative, unnamed claimants, nor any other continuing interest that would
preserve her suit from mootness.” Genesis, 133 S. Ct. at 1532.

Significance: The case, at a minimum, signals that five members of the Court view the
statutory collective action – a statutory cousin to the class action -- with disfavor. If it is
ultimately determined that a Rule 68 offer of judgment renders a collective action plaintiff’s
claim moot, the Genesis majority has indicated that it will not preserve the action, through
analogy to class action mootness principles, until other employees have an opportunity to
decide whether to join the collective action. The ultimate significance of the case will
depend, thus, on how the Court answers the question it assumed in Genesis – does an
unaccepted, Rule 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies the collective action plaintiff’s
claim render that claim moot? If the Court ultimately answers that question in the
affirmative, the Genesis decision paves the way for defendants to “pick off” collective action
plaintiffs and prevent FLSA collective actions from proceeding. The circuit courts have split
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on the Rule 68 issue. The dissenting justices would answer that question with a
resounding “No.” They emphasized that, like any other unaccepted settlement offer, an
unaccepted Rule 68 offer becomes “a legal nullity, with no operative effect.” Genesis, 133 S.
Ct. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Indeed, Rule 68 specifically provides that “[a]n
unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn.” The dissent, thus, exhorts the circuit courts to
reexamine their Rule 68 analysis: “[F]riendly suggestion to the Third Circuit: Rethink your
mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory. And a note to all other courts of appeal: Don’t try
this at home.” Id. at 1543 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The majority did not reach the issue but
did drop a footnote stating that circuit courts on both sides of the divide have “recognized
that a plaintiff’s claim may be satisfied even without the plaintiff’s consent.” Genesis, 133 S.
Ct. at 1529 n.4 (majority opinion). So, Genesis has drawn the battle lines on the Rule 68
question, which, in turn, will impact whether defendants may “pick off” collective action
plaintiffs through Rule 68 offers of complete relief. Stay tuned.
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013) (Breyer, J., for a unanimous
Court)

Summary: Plaintiff Greg Knowles filed a proposed class action against Defendant Standard
Fire Insurance Company (Standard Fire) in state court in Arkansas, alleging that Standard
Fire had wrongfully failed to include certain general contractor fees in loss payments made
to insureds. Knowles attempted to prevent removal of the action to federal court under
removal provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which permit removal of class
actions when the proposed class includes more than 100 members; there is minimal
diversity; and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. Knowles sought to preclude
removal by stipulating that the plaintiff class would not seek damages in excess of $5
million. He, thus, alleged in the Complaint that “Plaintiff and the Class stipulate they will
seek to recover total aggregate damages of less than five million dollars.” Knowles likewise
attached an affidavit to the Complaint that stipulated that Knowles and the class would not
“at any time during this case . . . seek damages for the class . . . in excess of $5 million.”
When Defendant Standard Fire removed the case to federal court, Knowles timely moved to
remand, arguing that the stipulation to less than CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy
minimum precluded federal court jurisdiction. The District Court found that the class’s
damages would have exceeded $5 million by a small amount, but for the stipulation.
Concluding that the stipulation was effective to limit the proposed class’s damages to less
than CAFA’s amount in controversy, the District Court remanded the case to state court.
The Eighth Circuit exercised its discretion under CAFA to decline review of the remand
order, but the Supreme Court granted Standard Fire’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Holding: Before class certification, a proposed named plaintiff’s stipulation cannot bind
proposed class members, but is binding only on his own behalf. Thus, a named plaintiff’s
pre-certification stipulation that damages are less than CAFA’s $5 million amount-incontroversy requirement is ineffective to avoid removal.

Significance: The decision resolves a split in circuits and clarifies that named plaintiffs in
proposed class action law suits may not avoid removal to federal court by stipulating, precertification, to less than the amount in controversy.
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B.

Arbitration

American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (Scalia, J., majority
opinion; 5-3)

Summary: Plaintiffs, Italian Colors Restaurant (Italian Colors) and other merchants who
accept American Express cards, signed a standard-form agreement with American Express
Company and a wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, Amex) that required all disputes to
be resolved by arbitration. The agreement further provided that there would be “no right
or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class basis.” The Plaintiff-merchants
subsequently filed a class action against Amex, alleging that Amex had, in violation of the
antitrust laws, used its monopoly power regarding charge cards to require Plaintiffs to
accede to credit card rates approximately 30 percent higher than competitors’ credit card
rates. Plaintiffs alleged an illegal tying agreement under the Sherman Antitrust Act and
sought treble damages. Amex countered by moving to compel individual arbitration
regarding the alleged tying arrangement. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and submitted a
declaration of an economist that concluded that the required expert analysis to pursue the
suit would cost at least several hundred thousand dollars and might exceed $1 million. The
economist also opined that the maximum plaintiff’s award in the case would be $12,850,
and, even when trebled to $38,549, the cost of pursuing the action, on an individual basis,
would be prohibitively expensive. Plaintiffs noted that the agreement with Amex also
foreclosed all other options for bringing the suit in an economically feasible manner. The
agreement forbade any kind of joinder or consolidation of claims or parties; it included a
confidentially provision that precluded Plaintiffs from arranging to produce a common
expert report with other merchants; and it precluded any shifting of costs to Defendants,
even if Plaintiffs prevailed. Further, Amex refused to enter stipulations that might prevent
the need for an expert report or reduce the issues on which expert information would be
necessary. The dissenting opinion characterized the agreement as one that “cuts off not
just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary costs.” It
concluded that the agreement, in essence, provided Italian Colors with two unappealing
options: “Spend way, way, way more money than your claim is worth, or relinquish your
Sherman Act rights.” On these facts, the District Court granted the motion to compel
individual arbitration, but the Second Circuit reversed.
Holding: The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires that courts “rigorously enforce” a
waiver of class arbitration – even one in a standard form contract – because it constitutes
the party’s agreement. This rule governs, absent a contrary congressional command, even
if the claim at issue is created by a federal statute and even if plaintiff’s cost of individually
pursuing the claim would far exceed the potential recovery. The majority further (1) found
no congressional command that would preserve the antitrust claim at issue, though the
Court recognized that Congress sought to facilitate antitrust claims by, for instance,
providing for treble damages; and (2) held inapplicable, over a vigorous dissent, the
common law exception that would invalidate agreements that prevent “effective
vindication” of federal statutory rights.
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Significance: The case emphasizes that a majority of the Supreme Court believes
arbitration agreements – even those in standard form contracts and on which one party
had no real opportunity for input – must be enforced, even to the extent of extinguishing
any opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue a congressionally created claim. The Court
indicated, as it often does, that “[n]o legislation [including the Sherman Act, which was at
issue] pursues its purposes at all costs[,]” see Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 535-26 (1987) (per curiam)), but one
wonders, in light of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, whether the Court has not, in fact,
amended that proposition to be, “[n]o legislation – except the Federal Arbitration Act –
pursues its purposes at all costs.” The five-justice majority also appears willing to reduce
to a virtual nullity the common-law “effective vindication” exception to enforcement of
arbitration agreements, which would render unenforceable arbitration agreements that
prevent effective vindication of congressionally-created, statutory causes of action.

Indeed, the effective denial of other federal, statutory claims in light of mandatory
arbitration agreements that preclude class arbitration has already begun. In Southerland v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, Plaintiff Southerland filed a class action on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated employees of Ernst & Young, LLP (Ernst & Young) to recover unpaid
overtime wages. Southerland’s individual unpaid wages amounted to only $1,867.02.
When Ernst & Young moved to compel individual arbitration of the claims, pursuant to
employment agreements that included a provision that all disputes be arbitrated and that
“disputes pertaining to different employees will be heard in separate proceedings,” the
District Court denied the motion, noting that enforcing the ban on class arbitration would
effectively immunize Ernst & Young from all claims by Plaintiff. The Second Circuit, whose
opinion was overturned in Italian Colors, reversed. Applying Italian Colors, the Second
Circuit concluded that (1) no contrary congressional command in the FLSA precluded class
action waivers in arbitration agreements; and (2) the effective vindication exception does
not apply where a class waiver provision in an arbitration agreement renders a FLSA claim
economically infeasible. See Southerland v. Ernst & Young, No. 12-304cv (2d Cir. August 9,
2013). Thus, it appears that, absent action by Congress, arbitration agreements may be
crafted to preclude class arbitration, to render all other dispute resolution options
economically infeasible, and, hence, to immunize defendants from liability under
congressionally created, federal-law claims.
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (Kagan, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Pediatrician, John Sutter, entered into a contract with Oxford Health Plans
(Oxford), under which Sutter agreed to provide medical care to those in Oxford’s network,
and Oxford, a health insurance company, agreed to pay for services provided. Alleging that
Oxford failed to pay amounts owing under the contract fully and promptly, Sutter filed a
class action alleging breach of contract and other state-law claims on behalf of himself and
other New Jersey physicians who had contracted with Oxford. Oxford moved to compel
arbitration based on a provision of the contract between Sutter and Oxford that provided,
in part, as follows: “No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement
shall be instituted before any court and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and
binding arbitration in New Jersey. . . .” The trial court granted the motion compelling
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arbitration, and the parties agreed that the arbitrator would decide whether the contract
permitted class arbitration. Focusing on the text of the agreement and the intent of the
parties, the arbitrator concluded that the agreement permitted class arbitration. Oxford,
thereafter, filed in federal district court to vacate the decision, arguing that the arbitrator
had “exceeded [his] powers” under § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The
District Court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to arbitration. Mid-arbitration,
the Supreme Court decided Stolt Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664
(2010), which provided that class arbitration may be required only if the parties agreed by
contract to class arbitration. Upon Oxford’s prompt motion for reconsideration in light of
Stolt Nielsen, the arbitrator again concluded that the arbitration agreement authorized
class arbitration. Oxford returned to federal court with a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s
second decision. The District Court again denied the motion, and the Third Circuit
affirmed.

Holding: The extremely limited review of arbitration permitted under § 10(a)(4) of the
Federal Arbitration Act means that a court must uphold an arbitrator’s decision that a
contract authorizes class arbitration, even if the court is convinced that the arbitrator erred
in its contractual interpretation. “Because the parties ‘bargained for the arbitrator’s
construction of their agreement,’ an arbitral decision ‘even arguably construing or applying
the contract’ must stand, regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits.” Oxford, 133 S. Ct. at
2068 (citations omitted). The question on review is not whether the arbitrator is right, but
whether she interpreted the contract.

Significance: The Oxford decision may ultimately be of limited significance in terms of
whether the arbitrator or a court will decide if an ambiguous arbitration agreement
authorizes class arbitration. The Oxford Court noted in footnote 2 of the decision that the
availability of class arbitration may be a “question of arbitrability.” Questions of
“arbitrability” are “gateway matters” that are presumptively for courts – rather than
arbitrators – to decide. Oxford, 133 S. Ct. at 2068 n.2. Because the parties in Oxford had
agreed that the arbitrator would determine the issue, the Court had no opportunity to
consider the “arbitrability” issue, but look for the Court to resolve this in the near future, as
its flagging of the underlying issue is unmistakable. Further, the Oxford decision,
reaffirming the extreme deference accorded an arbitrator’s “arguable” construction of a
contract, should encourage those who draft arbitration agreements and who often disfavor
class arbitration, to include explicit exclusions of class arbitration in future agreements.
Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam)

Summary: Plaintiffs Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider entered confidentiality
and noncompetition agreements with their employer, Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. (NitroLift). The agreements also contained an arbitration clause that provided that “[a]ny
dispute, difference, or unresolved question . . . shall be settled by arbitration . . . .” When
Howard and Schneider, thereafter, left Nitro-Lift and began working for one of its
competitors, Nitro-Lift served them with a demand for arbitration. Howard and Schneider
responded by filing suit in the District Court of Johnston County, Oklahoma, seeking a
declaration that the noncompetition agreements were null and void. The state court
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dismissed the Complaint, concluding that the issues were for an arbitrator, rather than the
court, to resolve. Before the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Nitro-Lift also argued that
decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the Federal Arbitration Act
required that arbitrators, rather than courts, resolve the contract construction issues.
Despite these cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a court may review the validity
of an underlying contract, and it concluded that the noncompetition agreements in the
contracts at issue were “void and unenforceable” under Okla. Stat., Tit. 15, § 219A.
Holding: It is a “mainstay” of the substantive law of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that
attacks on the validity of a contractual agreement, as opposed to attacks on the validity of
an arbitration clause, are to be determined initially by the arbitrator and not by a state or
federal court. In response to the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reasoning that a more
“specific” Oklahoma state statute should govern over the more general Federal Arbitration
Act, the Supreme Court rejoined that the ancient interpretive principle that the specific
controls the general “applies only to conflict between laws of equivalent dignity. . . . There
is no general-specific exception to the Supremacy Clause.” Nitro-Lift Technologies, 133 S.
Ct. at 504.

Significance: The Court used the vehicle of a unanimous, per curiam opinion to reprimand
the Oklahoma Supreme Court for assuming that state law could control an issue governed
by federal law – the FAA and Supreme Court interpretation of the FAA. The Court
emphasized that “[i]t is the responsibility of this Court to say what a statute means, and
once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of
the governing rule of law.” Nitro-Lift, 133 S. Ct. at 503 (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994)). Interestingly, this is the second year in a row that the
Supreme Court has resorted to the use of a unanimous, per curiam opinion to chastise a
state supreme court for failing to follow the FAA and Supreme Court decisions construing
the FAA. See Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (concluding that
Supreme Court of West Virginia “misread[] and disregard[ed] the precedents of th[e]
[Supreme] Court interpreting the FAA[] [and] did not follow controlling federal law
implementing that basic principle” when the state supreme court held unenforceable “all
predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal injury or wrongful
death against nursing homes”).
C.

Attorney’s Fees & Costs

Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012) (per curiam)

Summary: Plaintiff Steven Lefemine and other members of Columbia Christians for Life
(CCL) demonstrate and carry graphic pictures of aborted fetuses during their
demonstrations. In November 2005, Lefemine and other CCL members demonstrated in
Greenwood County, South Carolina. Because of complaints about the graphic signs, a
county police officer warned Lefemine that he would be cited for breach of the peace if he
continued to carry the sign. Lefemine stated that he had a First Amendment right to carry
the sign, but he, ultimately, discontinued the demonstration because he feared being
ticketed. The following year, Lefemine’s attorney sent a letter to the Greenwood County
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Sheriff stating that Lefemine and CCL would return, would carry graphic signs, and would
pursue legal remedies to protect their First Amendment rights, if necessary. When the
sheriff’s department responded that it had violated no rights, would insist that
demonstrators relinquish graphic signs, and would, moreover, ticket those who refused,
CCL elected not to protest in the county for the next two years.

In October 2008, Lefemine filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Greenwood
County police officers alleging First Amendment violations and seeking nominal damages, a
declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and attorney’s fees. Finding that
Defendants had violated Lefemine’s First Amendment rights, the District Court entered a
permanent injunction, enjoining Defendants “from engaging in content-based restrictions
on display of graphic signs” during demonstrations. The District Court also (1) denied
nominal damages, concluding that the illegality of Defendants’ conduct had not been clearly
established at the time of Defendants’ actions; and (2) denied attorney’s fees, concluding
that fees were not warranted “[u]nder the totality of the facts” of the case. Lefemine v.
Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 627 (D.S.C. 2010). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of
attorney’s fees, holding that Lefemine was not a “prevailing party” for purposes of § 1988,
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the District
Court’s order did not “alte[r] the relative positions of the parties” because it only
prohibited “unlawful” conduct by Defendants and only ordered the Defendants to “comply
with the law and safeguard constitutional rights in the future.” Lefemine v. Davis, 672 F.3d
292, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2012)
Holding: A plaintiff who secures a permanent injunction is a “prevailing party,” for
purposes of the § 1988 attorney’s fee statute, even if he receives no award of damages,
whenever the permanent injunction constitutes “actual relief on the merits of [the] claim
that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Lefemine, 133 S. Ct. at 11
(citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 1110-12 (1992)).

Significance: The Court emphasized that it has “repeatedly” held that injunctive and
declaratory relief will ordinarily meet the “prevailing party” standard § 1988. Because
Plaintiff desired and obtained the right to carry graphic signs during demonstrations, in the
face of police threat of criminal sanctions, the permanent injunction created the required
material alteration in the parties’ relationship, even though the District Court’s order was a
general instruction to the Defendants to “comply with the law.”
Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013) (Thomas, J., majority opinion; 7-2)

Summary: When Plaintiff Olivia Marx defaulted on student loans guaranteed by Edfund, a
division of the California Student Aid Commission, Edfund hired General Revenue
Corporation (GRC) to provide collection services. Marx thereafter sued GRC, alleging unfair
collection practices under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). After a one-day
bench trial, the District Court determined that Marx had not established any violations of
the FDCPA. GRC, as the “prevailing” party in the litigation, sought “costs” (but not
attorney’s fees) in the amount of $7,779.16, for witness fees, witness travel expenses, and
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deposition transcript fees. Plaintiff Marx opposed the request for costs, arguing, first, that
Rule 54(d)(1) gives courts discretion to award costs to a “prevailing” party, “[u]nless a
federal statute . . . provides otherwise;” and, second, that a provision of the FDCPA
“provide[d] otherwise.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Marx argued that the language of
§ 1692k(a)(3) explicitly prohibited prevailing defendants in a FDCPA case from obtaining
costs unless the District Court also found that the plaintiff had brought the action “in bad
faith and for the purpose of harassment.” Section 1692k(a)(3) of the FDCPA provides as
follows: “On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad
faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney’s
fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.” Because the District Court had
made no finding that she had brought the action in bad faith and for the purpose of
harassment, Marx argued that GRC was not entitled to costs. The District Court rejected the
argument that § 1692k(a)(3) displaced the court’s general discretion to award costs. It,
thereafter, disallowed some of the costs requested by GRC and awarded GRC $4,543.03 in
costs. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed that § 1692k(a)(3) did not displace a
court’s discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) to award costs to prevailing defendants.

Holding: Section 1692k(a)(3) of the FDCPA does not restrict a prevailing defendant’s right
to receive costs of litigation to instances in which a District Court finds that the plaintiff
brought the action “in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.” Because § 1692k(a)(3)
addresses only situations in which a plaintiff files a claim in bad faith and for the purpose of
harassment, but it is silent regarding cases in which a district court does not make a finding
of bad faith and purpose to harass, § 1692k(a)(3) does not displace the background
principle of Rule 54(d)(1) that a court has discretion to award costs to prevailing parties,
including prevailing defendants.
Significance: The case settles a conflict in circuits, concluding that a prevailing defendant
in an FDCPA case may recover costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1), even in the absence of a
finding that the plaintiff filed the suit in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.
Additionally, for those interested in arguments in statutory construction, including the
context of a statute, that may overcome what appears to be the plain language of a statute,
the typical dictionary definition of terms, the expression unius, exclusio alterius canon, and
the canon against surplusage, the Marx case is a must read.

V.

BUSINESS
A.

Business Law

American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (Scalia, J., majority
opinion; 5-3)
Summary: American Express places a clause in all of its contracts requiring customers to
submit disputes to arbitration and to waive any right to bring a class action arbitration
proceeding. Plaintiff restaurant nevertheless tried to bring a class action arbitration
claiming violations of the federal antitrust laws.
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Holding: The contractual waiver will be enforced. Nothing in the federal antitrust laws
COMPELS an entitlement to bring a claim in a class action format. The fact that it will never
be cost effective to bring such suits on an individual basis (i.e., damages for particular
individual’s harm would never come close to the cost to litigate the issue) is irrelevant
since this is not a technical prohibition on bringing such a suit to enforce the relevant law.

Significance: After this case it is absolutely clear that a waiver of class arbitration
contained in a contract is enforceable due to the primacy of the Federal Arbitration Act. If a
person signs a contract with a waiver of class action arbitration clause, the only way to
escape it is (1) to show a specific statutory directive that gives an actual entitlement to a
class action proceeding, or (2) to establish contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability that would invalidate the contract. Thus, many meritorious claims will
now never be litigated due to such clauses, and businesses are likely to insert such clauses
in their form contracts to insulate themselves from such claims.
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., majority opinion; 6-3)

Summary: Connecticut Retirement brought a class action federal securities fraud suit
against Amgen based on allegations that Amgen publicly made material misrepresentations
regarding some of its key products. To prove the underlying case, specific reliance on the
false statements is required unless the “fraud on the market” theory applies. Here, the
district court found it did and certified the class action. Amgen contended that the plaintiff
must also prove another element, the “materiality” of the false statements, prior to
certification of the class action.

Holding: Materiality is an issue common to all members of the class and thus does not need
to be resolved prior to the certification of the class action.
Significance: Requiring proof of materiality at the class certification stage would have
been a significant impediment to securities fraud class actions. The Court’s decision,
unsurprisingly, retains current law and refuses to increase the plaintiff’s burden in
pursuing such class actions. More significant is the dicta in the dissents and in Justice
Alito’s concurrence which hint that the Court may soon be willing to reconsider the
appropriateness of the “fraud on the market” theory itself in a future case.

Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013) (Breyer, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Mr. Bullock borrowed funds from a trust, for which he was the trustee, and
invested the funds for his own benefit. While he ultimately repaid the loans with interest, a
court ordered him to disgorge his profits from the investments made with the loans (more
than $250,000) since the loans were prohibited by basic tenets of trust law. The parties
conceded that Bullock did not in fact know that he violated trust law when he borrowed
from the trust for his personal use. Bullock then filed for bankruptcy seeking to have the
judgment discharged due to his inability to pay. The lower courts found that his debt was
not dischargeable in bankruptcy since it involved “defalcation.”
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Holding: The court defined “defalcation” as requiring an element of intent, which on
remand should enable Mr. Bullock to qualify for a discharge on the agreed facts.
Essentially, defalcation under the bankruptcy law was given its penal code meaning so that
a discharge is allowed unless he actually knew, or recklessly disregarded the risk, that his
conduct was wrongful.
Significance: Normally the Court broadly construes the discharge exceptions, but not so
here.
PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, 133 S. Ct. 1897 (2013) (Thomas, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: PPL Corp., a U.S. company, owned a large interest in a U.K. energy company.
The U.K. imposed a one-time “windfall tax” on this U.K. subsidiary. The tax was applied
only to certain companies that had been recently privatized by the U.K. government, and
the rate was applied to the difference between their initial privatization price and an
evaluation of their current value (which was derived based on an earnings approach). The
intent of the U.K. tax was to claw-back some of the benefit that had been lost to the fisc
when these companies were privatized at too low a price. Generally U.S. companies are
allowed to credit foreign income taxes they pay against their U.S. income tax liability, but
only if the foreign tax has the “predominant character” of an “income tax” in the U.S. sense.
The question was whether this one-time U.K. tax was in fact a creditable “income” tax.

Holding: In substance the U.K. tax was a tax on the income the U.K. subsidiary earned even
though the U.K. law did not itself characterize or directly calculate the tax as one based on
income.
Significance: This opinion reaffirms substance over form in tax cases and should make it
easier to claim a credit for foreign taxes that are described for foreign law purposes as not
income-based, but which can be economically recast by the payor as in fact taxes on its
foreign income.
US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013) (Kagan, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: McCutchen was injured in a car accident and received medical treatment paid
for under his employer’s (US Airways) health plan. That health plan contained a provision
requiring an employee to reimburse the plan if the employee later recovered monetary
damages from a third party. McCutchen ultimate filed suit due to the accident and
recovered approximately $100,000, of which $40,000 was paid to his attorney as a
contingent fee payment. US Airways sued to recover the net $60,000 received by
McCutchen, and he attempted to void the contractual reimbursement obligation using
various equitable defenses.

Holding: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), an employer is
permitted to enforce the contractual terms of its plans, and equitable defenses are not
permitted to disturb the contractually agreed to results. Hence, McCutchen must
reimburse the health plan. However, since the contract did not specify how litigation costs
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were to be treated, the Court will apply equitable principles to fill in this contractual gap
and allow McCutchen to recover part of his attorney fees from the plan.

Significance: Going forward there is no doubt that the contractual terms of ERISA-covered
plans will be enforced, as long as they are not ambiguous, without resort to equitable
doctrines. While this may be a hardship to particular claimants, it does create certainty
regarding the primacy of these contracts, which arguably benefits all ERISA-covered
benefit plans in the long run.
B.

Intellectual Property Law

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Nike brought a trademark infringement suit against Already, and Already filed a
counterclaim for declaration that Nike’s registered mark is invalid. Nike, thereafter, issued
an unconditional and irrevocable covenant not to sue and moved to dismiss both its claim
and Already’s counterclaim on the grounds that the covenant extinguished the case or
controversy. The Court stated that given the breadth of the covenant not to sue, “it could
not reasonably be expected” that Nike would resume its enforcement efforts against
Already. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence (joined by three other Justices) warned that
covenants not to sue ought not to be taken as an automatic means for a trademark owner to
abandon an action without incurring the risk of ensuing adverse adjudication.
Holding: The case is moot because Nike’s covenant not to sue prohibited it from bringing
any further trademark infringement suits against Already and, thus, there is no longer a
case or controversy.
Significance: Unconditional and irrevocable covenants not to sue will divest the federal
courts of jurisdiction.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (Breyer, J., for a unanimous
Court)

Summary: This case presented the issue of whether the Copyright Act’s “first sale”
doctrine, which permits the owner of a lawfully purchased copy to resell it without
permission of the copyright owner, applies to copies of copyrighted works made outside
the U.S. and later imported and sold in the U.S. The Court rejected the argument that the
phrase “lawfully made under this title,” found in Copyright Act’s “first sale” provision, 17
U.S.C. § 109, applies only to copies made in the U.S. The Court rather, adopted the position
that the phrase imposes a non-geographical limitation and that the doctrine applies where,
as here, copies are manufactured abroad with permission of the copyright owner.
Holding: The “first sale” doctrine applies to copies lawfully manufactured abroad and sold
in the U.S.
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Significance: U.S. copyright owners cannot prevent the importation into the U.S. of gray
market works intended for sale overseas.
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: The issue was whether the federal courts have exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims that arise out of patent infringement
litigation. The Court concluded that the malpractice claim at issue may be heard in state
court because the federal issue presented, i.e., whether the patentee could have
successfully asserted “experimental use” negation to the “on sale”or “public use” bar, does
not raise a substantial federal issue. The Court noted that, no matter how the state courts
resolve federal issue, the outcome of prior federal patent litigation will not change and that
federal courts are not bound by state court precedents.
Holding: The federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases does not apply to
state-law legal malpractice claims in patent cases.

Significance: State courts have jurisdiction over malpractice suits even in cases where the
underlying action is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (Kagan, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Monsanto, the holder of a patent on genetically modified soybean seeds, sued a
farmer who, contrary to the terms of the licensing agreement, purchased commodity seed
from a local grain elevator for late season planting and saved seed harvested from that
planting for replanting in following seasons. Monsanto sued for patent infringement; the
farmer raised the patent exhaustion doctrine as a defense. Under this doctrine, the
authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, the
right to use or resell the article. The Court concluded that the exhaustion doctrine does not
apply in this case. While the farmer could resell patented soybeans he purchased, he could
not make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission.
Holding: Growing new plants that contain the patented genetic material constitutes
copying patented material and is, therefore, not protected by the doctrine of patent
exhaustion.

Significance: This was a major victory for the biotech industry, insofar as the Court
rejected a broad interpretation of the patent exhaustion doctrine.

Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (Thomas,
J., for a unanimous Court)
Summary: This case raised the issue of whether isolated naturally occurring DNA is
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The patented invention (the DNA) is used
to help detect increased risk of breast and ovarian cancer. Products of nature are not
eligible for patent protection. “Myriad did not create anything,” Justice Thomas asserted.
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“To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from its
surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.” The Court clarified that claims
directed to non-naturally occurring complementary DNA (cDNA) are eligible for patent
protection.
Holding: Because naturally occurring DNA is a product of nature, it is not eligible for
patent protection.

Significance: This was a major loss for the biotech industry. This is the latest case from
the Court in which the Court has cut back on what qualifies as patentable subject matter.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)(machine or transformation test is not sole test
for determining whether claimed process recited patentable subject matter); Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)
(“administering and determining “ process that helps doctors treat patients with
autoimmune diseases is not eligible for patent protection)
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (Breyer, J., majority opinion; 5-3)

Summary: In bringing a new drug to market, the brand-name manufacturer must submit a
New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for review and approval, which involves a long,
costly testing process. Once a brand-name drug has been approved, the Hatch-Waxman
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, allows a would-be generic manufacturer of the same drug to rely on the
approval already given to the brand-name drug by submitting an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) that requires the generic to certify, inter alia, that its drug has the same
active ingredient(s), dose, strength, and delivery method as, and is the bioequivalent of the
brand-name drug. The generic manufacturer must also certify that any patents claimed in
the brand-name’s NDA either have expired or will expire, will not be infringed, or are
invalid. Claiming that a patent is invalid or will not be infringed automatically counts as
patent infringement. If the patent-holder brings an infringement suit within 45 days, the
FDA must withhold approval of the generic for 30 months before approving the generic,
unless the dispute is resolved in favor of the generic manufacturer before then. The first
generic manufacturer to file an ANDA and certify that a patent is invalid or will not be
infringed enjoys a 180-day exclusivity period which begins to run on the day when that
manufacturer begins to market the generic drug. This exclusivity period can prove
extremely valuable (possibly as much as several hundred million dollars) to the generic
manufacturer who, during that period, has the exclusive right to market a generic version
of that drug.
This has led to the development of reverse payment settlements within the pharmaceutical
industry to resolve these patent disputes. In a reverse payment settlement, in order to end
the patent litigation, the generic manufacturer, the alleged infringer, agrees not to bring the
generic drug to market for a certain period of time-generally less than the time remaining
on the patent. In exchange, the patent-holder agrees to pay the generic manufacturer a
sum of money for each year that the generic is withheld from the market. Because the firstto-file generic manufacturer has the 180-day exclusivity period, which does not begin to
run until that generic manufacturer actually markets the generic product, if the brand41

name manufacturer enters into such a settlement with that generic manufacturer, the
brand-name manufacturer can keep all competition from generic manufacturers out of the
marketplace. The FTC has filed numerous complaints against companies entering into
these settlements alleging that by agreeing to keep competition out of the market and share
in monopoly profits, these companies are violating multiple antitrust laws. Disparate
outcomes in these cases have led to a circuit split on the validity of these settlements.
Holding: Reverse settlement payments may be challenged but are not presumptively
illegal. In determining the validity of a reverse payment settlement, a court should take a
“rule of reason” approach and look at the size of the payment, the scale of the payment in
relation to the payor’s anticipated litigation costs, other services which it might represent
payment for, and the lack of any other convincing justification to determine whether it
carries a risk of significant anticompetitive effects. This analysis appropriately balances
the competing concerns at the heart of patent and antitrust laws.

Significance: This decision resolves a circuit split on the correct test to apply to claims that
reverse payment settlements violate antitrust laws. It will likely limit the frequency of
these settlements in the future and, according to the dissent, could decrease the frequency
of settlements generally, particularly in patent cases.

VI.

THE HODGE-PODGE OF ARGLE-BARGLE
A.

Family Law

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (Alito, J., majority opinion; 5-4)
The “Baby Veronica” Case

Summary: Father, who is Cherokee Indian, learned that his fiancé, who is Hispanic, was
pregnant. The estranged couple ended their long-distance relationship several months
later. Father replied to a text message from Mother indicating he would rather relinquish
his parental rights than pay child support. Mother arranged for the adoption of the child,
and the white couple she selected supported her emotionally and financially during the
pregnancy and birth. Father was first notified of the pending adoption four months after
the child’s birth. He was served with legal papers for the adoption which he hastily signed
just before deployment for military duty in Iraq. The next day he realized the papers were
for a third-party adoption rather than sole rights to Mother and immediately contacted a
lawyer. The case was stayed for fifteen months while Father was stationed in Iraq, with
temporary custody awarded to the adoptive parents. After trial, the state court awarded
custody to Father under the authority of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) which protects parents of Indian children against involuntary termination of
parental rights and creates a placement preference for Indian parents. The Act was passed
to remediate a racialized history of removing Indian children from tribal communities for
assimilation.
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Holding: The ICWA does not apply to protect the custodial rights of a Native American
biological father who never had custody of his child. Justice Thomas concurred on the
grounds that there was no constitutional basis of power for the ICWA and federal
regulation of Indian child custody proceedings.

Significance: The decision to extend legal protections to only those biological fathers who
have preexisting physical or legal custody of their children is consistent with the Court’s
decisions holding that the Constitution does not compel the protection of a unwed father’s
parental interest unless he has established biology plus a social, family-like
relationship. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989). Other Court precedents hold that an unwed, biological father’s consent to adoption
is not required unless he has provided financial support during the pregnancy or initiated
other social connection with the child. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S.248 (1983). Adoptive Couple potentially narrows the reach of the ICWA
and raises questions about the continued viability of the federal law that creates different
child custody standards based on the race of the child. The result directed no specific
action as to the custody of Veronica, now 4, who has lived for the last eighteen months with
her father and his extended family. On remand, the state court ordered the immediate
return of the child to the white adoptive parents, ignoring the usual residential parent
presumption in change of custody cases. Father refuses to relinquish custody of his
daughter and court challenges continue.
Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Father, a U.S. citizen, and Mother, a U.K. citizen, married in Germany where
their daughter was born. Father was deployed to Afghanistan, and child lived with Mother
in Scotland for three years. Parents reunited in Alabama, but Father then filed for divorce
and Mother was deported for overstaying her tourist visa and because of father’s
allegations of domestic violence. Mother brought suit in U.S. district court directing the
child’s return to Scotland as the location of her “habitual residence” and the proper place
for child custody proceedings pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, ratified and implemented by the United States in 1988. See
42 U.S.C. § 11601. Father’s appeal was dismissed as moot because child had already been
returned.

Holding: A district court’s order as to international child custody jurisdiction is appealable
like any other order. The fact that the child has already left the country does not moot the
case.

Significance: Child custody proceedings on the merits of the Chafins’ case will continue in
Scotland where the U.K. courts have rejected automatic re-return orders shuffling the child.
The decision has the potential to increase rival custody proceedings by its encouragement
of appeals, notwithstanding the Court’s appreciation for the potential for delay and
uncertainty and the associated risk to the well-being of the child.
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Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: A federal employee designated his wife as the beneficiary of his group life
insurance policy. They subsequently divorced. He remarried in 2002 and died in 2008
without changing his beneficiary to his second wife. The second wife sued under a Virginia
statute providing that the first wife was liable to the widow for insurance proceeds paid
based on a failure to change the beneficiary designation following a divorce.
Holding: The federal employee group insurance law preempts state law providing for
automatic change in beneficiary following a divorce.

Significance: The case resolves a circuit and state split, applying the same rule of
preemption of federal insurance law for veterans and servicemen.
B.

Miscellaneous

Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil
enforcement action under the Investment Advisors Act (IAA) against Bruce Alpert and
Marc Gabelli for conduct that spanned a period from 1999 through 2002. Alpert and
Gabelli moved to dismiss the action as untimely, citing the five-year limitations period in 28
U.S.C. § 2462, a general limitations statute that governs many penalty provisions in the U.S.
Code, and arguing that the SEC filed the action outside the requisite five-year period. The
District Court dismissed the action, but the Second Circuit reversed. The Second Circuit
held that a “discovery rule” should be read into the five-year limitations period in § 2462
for “claims that sound in fraud.” SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 60 (2nd Cir. 2011). Under the
discovery rule, the Second Circuit concluded that “the statute of limitations for a particular
claim does not accrue until that claim is discovered, or could have been discovered with
reasonable diligence, by the plaintiff.” Id. at 59.
Holding: A civil enforcement action alleging fraudulent conduct and governed by the fiveyear limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, accrues when the defendant’s allegedly
fraudulent conduct occurs, not when, pursuant to a “discovery rule,” the government
discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraudulent conduct.

Significance: The case clarifies that a discovery rule will not extend the government’s time
to file enforcement actions based on fraudulent conduct in actions in which the statute of
limitations is set by 28 U.S.C. § 2462. A unanimous Court relied on the plain language of the
statutory provision and on a number of policy arguments to determine that government
enforcers have only five years from the date of the allegedly unlawful conduct in which to
file suit. Among the policy bases for the decision are the following: (1) government
enforcement agencies differ from private plaintiffs – agencies, such as the SEC, are
specifically charged with ferreting out fraud and are provided many tools for doing so,
while private parties are not held to “live in a constant state of investigation” or to “spend
[their] days looking for evidence that [they] were lied to or defrauded,” Gabelli, 133 S. Ct. at
44

1222; (2) government enforcers seek different relief – government enforcement actions
seek to punish and to label wrongdoers, while private parties generally seek compensation
for injury; (3) statutes of limitations promote security and justice and provide that “‘even
wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten,’” id. at 1221 (citations
omitted); and (4) litigation and administrative efficiency concerns counsel in favor of
denying a discovery rule absent express statutory provision, since it is difficult to
determine when “the government,” as opposed to a private party, has or reasonably should
have had knowledge of fraud, and § 2462 provides no information on which government
actor’s knowledge is relevant. Id. at 1223-24.
Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous
Court)

Summary: Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. (Dan’s City), a towing company, towed and,
ultimately, disposed of Robert Pelkey’s car, despite notice that Pelkey intended to pay
accumulated storage fees and reclaim the car. Pelkey sued Dan’s City in state court,
alleging state law claims under both the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act and New
Hampshire’s statutory and common-law regarding a bailee’s duty to use reasonable care in
dealing with a bailor’s property. The state-law claims were premised on Dan’s City’s failure
to comply with New Hampshire statutory requirements for disposing of abandoned
vehicles. Dan’s City countered that all state-law claims were expressly preempted by
§ 14501(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), which
provides as follows: “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor
carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” The New Hampshire trial court
determined that all state claims were preempted by § 14501(c)(1), but the New Hampshire
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state-law claims at issue were not preempted
because the disposal of the car months after it was towed did not constitute a service “with
respect to the transportation of property” and because the disposal of the vehicle was too
remote to constitute a part of the towing “service.”

Holding: Section 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA does not preempt state-law claims arising
from the storage and later disposal of a car after the towing of the car has ended because
(1) claims related to the post-towing disposal of a vehicle relate to conduct in disposing of a
vehicle, not conduct regarding the “transportation of property;” and (2) claims regarding
later disposal of a towed vehicle are not sufficiently related to the towing “service”
provided by the motor carrier to be preempted.
Significance: The case resolves a split in state supreme court decisions regarding whether
state-law claims arising from a towing company’s post-towing disposal of a vehicle are
preempted by § 14501(c)(1). Further, the Court emphasized that the phrase “with respect
to the transportation of property” in § 14501(c)(1) “massively limits” the state-law claims
that come within the preemptive reach of § 14501(c)(1). The Court’s previous similar
statement was in a dissenting opinion only. In Dan’s City, the Supreme Court emphasizes in
a unanimous opinion that state claims relating to the “price, route, or service” of a motor
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carrier will not be preempted unless the state law claims also concern the motor carrier’s
“transportation” or “movement” of property.

American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013) (Kagan, J., for a
unanimous Court)

Summary: To respond to community concerns regarding pollution, congestion, and safety
that might accompany the proposed expansion of the Port of Los Angeles (Port), the City of
Los Angeles’s Board of Harbor Commissioners amended the tariff (a municipal ordinance)
governing the Port. The amendments required the Port’s terminal operators to enter into
“concession agreements” with “drayage” companies, i.e., trucking companies that load and
unload cargo from ships docking at the Port. The tariff required, inter alia, that the
concession agreements between terminal operators and drayage companies include
agreements by the drayage companies (1) to display on trucks a number for reporting
safety and environmental breaches; and (2) to provide a plan for off-street parking. The
tariff also established criminal penalties, including fines, to be imposed on terminal
operators for “each and every day” that a terminal operator permitted access to the Port by
a drayage truck that had not registered by entering into a concession agreement with the
terminal operator. The concession agreement included penalties for drayage companies
that signed and then violated the requirements of the concession agreement. The
American Trucking Associations (ATA), which represents trucking companies, including
drayage companies, brought suit against the City of Los Angeles and the Port, arguing that
the plackard and off-street parking provisions of the concession agreement were
preempted by § 14501(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act
(FAAAA). Section 14501(c)(1) provides that “a State [or local government] may not enact
or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to
a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of
property.” The City of Los Angeles and the Port argued that the concession agreements
were not “other provision[s] having the force and effect of law,” but merely a way of
advancing their commercial interests in expanding the Port. The District Court held that
§ 14501(c)(1) did not preempt the plackard and off-street parking provisions of the
concession agreements and also disagreed with other arguments of the ATA. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling regarding the preemptive scope of § 14501(c)(1)
and affirmed most other aspects of the District Court decision.
Holding: The plackard and off-street parking provisions of the concessions agreements
“hav[e] the force and effect of law” and, hence, are preempted – even though the Port
included the provisions in the concession agreements to further the Port’s business and
commercial interests. This is because the Port used classic regulatory authority, including
criminal penalties for noncompliance, rather than voluntary bargaining, to induce
companies to sign the agreements. Because the contract provisions have “the force and
effect of law,” and because there was no dispute that the contract provisions “related to a
price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of
property,” the provisions are expressly preempted by § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA.
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Significance: Contract provisions required by state or local governments for the purpose
of furthering the government’s proprietary interests may have “the force or effect of law”
and may, thus, be expressly preempted by § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA, if the parties to the
contracts are coerced to agree to the contract terms by the government’s use of regulatory
tools available to the government only, such as criminal sanctions for failing to enter the
agreements.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., for a unanimous
Court)

Summary: The Supreme Court reached a 9-0 decision that generated a total of 4 opinions,
with seven justices signing on to different concurring opinions. The case involved
interpreting the jurisdictional scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), passed as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorizes tort claims to be brought in federal court for torts
"committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350. The Petitioners were Nigerian nationals now residing in the U.S. who sued Dutch,
British, and Nigerian oil companies alleging serious human rights violations committed in
Nigeria. The Second Circuit dismissed all claims on the basis that the law of nations does
not recognize corporate liability. The Court requested briefing on the broader issue of
whether and under what circumstances the statute recognizes a cause of action for
extraterritorial activities occurring within the territory of another sovereign. The Court
held that the actions of these corporations, all performed on Nigerian soil, did not provide a
basis for jurisdiction in U.S. courts. Concerned about courts intruding on sovereigns and
disrupting foreign policy and relations, Chief Justice Roberts for the Court applied the
presumption of extraterritoriality to the statute. Finding no explicit exceptions for this
cause of action, the Court dismissed the suit. The concurring opinions variously sought to
explain different modes of analyzing other potential causes of action under the ATS in
which there might be an opportunity for finding jurisdiction despite the conduct which
constituted the alleged violation having occurred within the sovereignty of another state.

Holding: The presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS; because the
actions of these corporations were all performed on Nigerian soil, they did not provide a
basis for jurisdiction in U.S. courts.

Significance: Even a unanimous decision does not yield clarity for lower courts in the
future to know just what ties to the United States will suffice to allow a tort claim for
wrongs committed outside of the United States that are egregious violations of
international law norms.
Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: An exception in the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721(b)(4), provides for releasing information for "use in connection with" or
"investigation in anticipation of" litigation. The Respondent plaintiffs’ attorneys obtained,
through a FOIA request, contact information of drivers who had bought cars in South
Carolina in order to both seek information about alleged dealer violations of state law and
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offer to represent those who provided it. They sent letters to determine if car dealers other
than those they already knew about from their current clients were charging unlawful fees,
and if so, offered to represent those buyers in their pending "private attorney general"
litigation against the offending car dealers. The attorneys needed to match buyers with
dealerships in order to have standing to pursue the claims against those dealerships. The
plaintiffs won the underlying suit (Herron) against the car dealers, but some of the solicited
car buyers filed this suit claiming violation of the DPPA. The Court narrowly construed the
exception, held that attorney solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose under the
(b)(4) litigation exception, found that the letters could be solicitations, and remanded the
case for a determination of whether the predominant purpose of the letters was
solicitation. This potentially exposes the respondents to millions – what the dissent
characterized as "astronomical" – in liquidated damages. The dissent noted that in the
Herron lawsuit, the Respondent attorneys had been under a duty to protect the interests of
the very buyers from whom they sought information to determine if the dealers had been
acting illegally, and that offering to represent buyers in accord with the ethical rules of the
state and pursuant to their duty should be recognized as in connection with that pending
litigation.

Holding: An attorney's letter, if “predominantly” solicitation of clients for a lawsuit, does
not fall within an exception of the DPPA that permits the disclosure of personal information
for use "in connection with" judicial and administrative proceedings, including
"investigation in anticipation of litigation."
Significance: This interpretation could make the Respondent plaintiff's attorneys liable for
extensive damages because they used contact information of drivers who had bought cars
in South Carolina to both seek information about alleged dealer violations of state law and
offer to represent those who provided it, even though the attorneys brought a successful
lawsuit on behalf of those buyers. A “minimalist” interpretation of a statute can override
state interpretations and have massive unexpected consequences.

Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., for a
unanimous Court; 8-0)

Summary: From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers occasionally deviated
from its schedule of water releases from the Clearwater Dam at the request of farmers.
These releases temporarily extended flooding into timber-growing areas owned and
managed by the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission. Although the Corps agreed to stop
the deviations, the Commission sued, claiming that the temporary flooding during treegrowing season caused the destruction of timber and damage to the terrain. It argued that
these effects constituted a taking of property that entitled the Commission to
compensation. Although the Court had already established both that government-induced
flooding can be a taking and that temporary takings can be compensable, the Government
argued that temporary, government-induced flooding cannot be considered a compensable
taking.
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Holding: There is no categorical exemption from Takings Clause liability for temporary,
government-induced flooding.
Significance: The Court rejected a proposed new categorical rule on Takings Clause
liability in specific factual circumstances.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (Kagan, J., majority opinion; 7-2)

Summary: When Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1977,
pled guilty to mail fraud in 2004, she was unaware of the immigration consequences of her
plea, and her attorney did not advise her of them. Immigration officials initiated removal
proceedings against her in 2009 based on the mail fraud conviction. While Petitioner was
attempting to overturn that conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty
pleas. Under Teague v. Lane, a new procedural rule does not apply retroactively to disturb a
final conviction. The issue was whether the Padilla holding constituted a new rule rather
than merely the application of the existing rule on ineffective assistance to a new situation.
Holding: Because the question of whether the Sixth Amendment requires attorneys to
inform clients of collateral consequences of convictions such as deportation was still an
open question before Padilla, the Court’s rule in that case was a new rule. Therefore, it
does not apply retroactively to the Petitioner’s earlier conviction.

Significance: As the majority treated this case as an ordinary application of the
retroactivity rule, there is little reason to think this decision will have great impact on
either the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence or on immigration law. It does add certainty
to many plea deals entered into prior to Padilla.
Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (Thomas, J., for a unanimous
Court)

Summary: California raisin growers refused to comply with the Secretary of Agriculture’s
Order requiring them to contribute to a reserve pool of raisins and were subject to civil
damages imposed by the USDA. The Order was issued under the authority of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), which regulates “handlers” of
certain agricultural commodities. The growers argued that as producers, they were not
handlers and therefore not subject to the Order. They also argued that the Order violated
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against taking property without just compensation. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the growers were handlers subject to the Order under the
AMAA, but it also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the takings claim, finding that
because Petitioners raised their takings claim as producers rather than as handlers, they
were required to raise the claim in the Court of Federal Claims.
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Holding: Because the Order only imposed duties on the Petitioners in their capacity as
handlers, their takings claim is necessarily raised in the same capacity, so the Ninth Circuit
has jurisdiction to decide the takings claim.

Significance: Although the case seems to open the door to constitutional challenges to
government fines, it was decided unanimously on jurisdictional grounds, so that door is not
yet opened.
Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012) (Kagan, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Plaintiff was a federal government employee who complained of sex and age
discrimination in the form of a hostile work environment and was then fired. Based on this
serious employment action, she filed a claim with the Merit Systems Protection Board, an
independent agency within the civil service system. When that claim was dismissed on
procedural grounds, she appealed in federal district court. Because her claim was an
employment discrimination case implicating Title VII, the civil service statute provides
special, complicated procedures. The government argued that because her claim had been
dismissed on procedural rather than substantive grounds, her appeal should have been to
the Federal Circuit rather than to federal district court.
Holding: Judicial review in this circumstance is appropriately sought in federal district
court.
Significance: Not much; a unanimous Court had little sympathy for the circuitous and
strained jurisdictional argument presented by the government.

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013) (Breyer, J., majority opinion; 7-2)

Summary: Petitioner Lozman owned a house that floated. He had it towed to various
locations before settling at the marina owned by the City of Riviera Beach. After several
disputes and an attempt to evict Lozman, the City brought a federal admiralty suit in rem
against the floating home. Lozman argued lack of admiralty jurisdiction because his home
was not a “vessel,” which is defined as “every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”

Holding: A thing is a vessel for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction if a reasonable observer
would consider it to be designed to any practical degree for carrying people or things on
water. Although capable of being towed on water with people and things transported in it,
this house—with no steering mechanism, no means of propulsion, and no design elements
particularly conducive to travel—was not a vessel any more than a washtub or a door
taken off its hinges.

Significance: These cases could be important in borderline maritime cases involving such
structures as offshore oil platforms and floating casinos. Workers assigned to vessels are
seamen, with certain legal protections. The scale in such cases has shifted slightly against a
“vessel” finding.
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University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (Kennedy,
J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: Respondent Nassar was a physician of Middle Eastern descent who was both a
University of Texas faculty member and a staff physician at the University-affiliated
Parkland Memorial Hospital. Respondent felt that one of his supervisors, Dr. Levine, was
biased against him because of his religious and ethnic background and complained to Dr.
Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Fitz. After arranging to continue working for the Hospital,
Respondent resigned his teaching post and sent a letter to Dr. Fitz and others stating that
he was leaving because of Dr. Levine’s harassment. Dr. Fitz, upset at Dr. Levine’s public
humiliation and wanting public exoneration for her, persuaded the Hospital to withdraw its
job offer to Respondent. Respondent filed an employment discrimination suit under Title
VII, alleging (1) racial and religious harassment by Dr. Levine resulting in Respondent’s
constructive discharge, and (2) retaliation by Dr. Fitz for Respondent’s complaining about
Dr. Levine’s behavior. The jury found for Respondent on both claims. The Fifth Circuit
vacated the constructive discharge claim but upheld the retaliation claim, reasoning that
retaliation claims, like claims of status-based discrimination, require only a showing that
retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action, rather than the butfor cause of that action.
Holding: Under Title VII, a plaintiff alleging retaliation must prove that, but for the
retaliatory motive, the employer would not have taken the adverse action. Although
Congress in 1991 established that Title VII liability holds when an employer has a
discriminatory motive, even if the employer also had other, legitimate motives, the Court
held that this express rule regarding status-based discrimination did not extend to
retaliation claims.
Significance: Retaliation claims under Title VII are now significantly more difficult to
prove, and other civil rights statutes regarding the burden of proof for retaliation claims
contain similar language that could result in the same conclusion.
Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (Alito, J., majority opinion; 5-4)

Summary: Petitioner Vance sued her employer, Ball State University, alleging a racially
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Her claim was based on alleged racial
harassment by Davis, another employee of the University. Under Title VII, an employer is
vicariously liable for the actions of a co-worker only if the employer was negligent in
controlling the work environment. In contrast, an employer is strictly liable for the
harassing conduct of a supervisor that results in a tangible employment action such as
firing or failing to promote an employee. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s enforcement guidance on this issue states that an individual is a supervisor if
the individual is authorized “to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions
affecting the employee” or if the individual is authorized “to direct the employee’s daily
work activities.” In this case, the courts below entered and upheld summary judgment
against Petitioner based on the conclusion that Davis was not Petitioner’s supervisor
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because Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline
Petitioner.
Holding: An employee is a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII
only if empowered to take tangible employment action against the victim.

Significance: This decision makes it significantly more difficult to hold employers liable for
the actions of individuals who have the power to direct the work activities of other
employees.
Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720 (2013) (Scalia, J., for a unanimous Court)

Summary: Petitioner Sekhar was convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act for
threatening to expose an alleged affair by the general counsel of the State Comptroller of
New York. The general counsel had recommended that the Comptroller not invest in a fund
managed by Sekhar’s firm, and Sekhar sought to force the general counsel to reverse that
recommendation. The Act defines extortion to mean “the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent” induced by particular kinds of wrongful threats. The property
alleged to have been sought by Sekhar was the general counsel’s recommendation to
approve the investment.
Holding: Attempting to compel an investment recommendation does not constitute “the
obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act.
Significance: There is now one fewer way to be convicted of a certain kind of blackmail.
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